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SOMETHING’S BREWING WITHIN THE 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Undeniably, each consumer is, to some extent, subconsciously 
attentive to advertising.1  Today, one probably cannot open a mailbox, 
drive down a street, or visit a favorite website without being ambushed 
by a multitude of different advertisements.  The vast majority of signs, 
flyers, and commercial messages that bombard each person every day 
are dismissed as no more than a nuisance.  Nevertheless, these 
commercial messages, whether they are realized, have a powerful impact 
on human behavior and consumption.2  In fact, many people have come 
to rely on such advertisements to guide many of their daily decisions.3  
While alcohol, tobacco, and gambling play a role in many individuals’ 
lives, most do not realize the battle being fought by the government and 
manufacturers over whether to permit or prohibit the dissemination of 
commercial information about these goods and activities to the public.4 
For example, in Pitt News and Swecker, state laws that prohibited 
advertisements of alcohol in educational publications forced college 
newspapers to remove these advertisements from their papers.5  In Pitt 
                                                 
1 Timothy E. Moore, Subliminal Perception:  Facts and Fallacies, SKEPTICAL INQUIRER, 
Spring 1992, at 273, 276.  Moore writes: 
Extravagant claims notwithstanding, advertising may affect us in 
subtle and indirect ways.  While there is no scientific evidence for the 
existence of “embedded” figures or words, let alone effects from them, 
the images and themes contained in advertisements may well 
influence viewers’ attitudes and values without their awareness.  In 
other words, the viewer may be well aware of the stimulus, but not 
necessarily aware of the connection between the stimulus and 
responses or reactions to it. 
Id. at 276. 
2 See Terence A. Shimp & Ivan L. Preston, Deceptive and Nondeceptive Consequences of 
Evaluative Advertising, 45 J. MKTG. 22, 22–23, 30 (1981) (concluding that more advertisers 
today are relying on deceptive, evaluative advertising by using puffery and ambiguous 
terms to lure in consumers instead of relying on factual data to support their claims). 
3 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 
(1976) (“Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is 
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what 
product . . . at what price. . . . It is a matter of public interest that [private economic] 
decisions . . . be intelligent and well informed.”). 
4 See Ronald Bayer, Tobacco, Commercial Speech, and Libertarian Values:  The End of the Line 
for Restrictions on Advertising?, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 356, 356–59 (2002) (using the 1985 
congressional debates concerning tobacco use as an example of how many private 
associations put pressure on government agencies to enact bans on commercial 
advertisements). 
5 Compare Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that a 
state statute prohibiting alcohol advertising on collegiate campuses was constitutional), 
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News v. Pappert, the Third Circuit held that the law banning alcohol 
advertisements was unconstitutional because there was no material 
evidence supporting the claim that this action would reduce underage 
drinking.6  However, in Educational Media Co. at Virginia Tech. v. Swecker, 
the Fourth Circuit held that the law banning alcohol advertisements was 
constitutional because there was a logical connection between alcohol 
advertising and increased underage drinking.7  This outcome is 
problematic because, in federal courts, like cases should yield identical 
results. 
Therefore, to clarify the perimeters of advertising in our society, the 
U.S. Supreme Court must settle on a concrete First Amendment standard 
that governs the commercial speech doctrine.  To begin, Part II of this 
Note provides a brief treatment of commercial speech under the First 
Amendment, followed by an explanation of the test used by the Supreme 
Court to interpret commercial speech in regard to the First Amendment 
and two different approaches circuit courts have taken in interpreting 
this test.8  Second, Part III discusses the positive and negative aspects of 
different interpretations of the Central Hudson test.9  Finally, Part IV 
explores which interpretations of the Central Hudson test should be 
followed and proposes a factors test for courts to use as guidance in 
deciding which restrictions on commercial speech should be permitted.10 
II.  BACKGROUND 
For centuries, America has prided itself on protecting individual 
liberties.11  A foundation of this core belief is the First Amendment right 
                                                                                                             
with Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a state statute 
prohibiting alcohol advertising on collegiate campuses was unconstitutional). 
6 379 F.3d at 107. 
7 603 F.3d at  590–91. 
8 See infra Part II (outlining the creation of the commercial speech doctrine in Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy, the test to determine if commercial speech can be restricted in 
Central Hudson, and the conflicting standards of the Central Hudson test as interpreted in 
Pitt News and Swecker). 
9 See infra Part III (articulating the policy reasons supporting and opposing the material 
degree and common sense standards in Central Hudson’s third prong and the least 
restrictive and reasonable fit standards in Central Hudson’s fourth prong). 
10 See infra Part IV (arguing that the Court should adopt the material degree standard for 
Central Hudson’s third prong and reaffirm the reasonable fit standard for Central Hudson’s 
fourth prong with the addition of a factors test). 
11 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 78 (3d ed. 2002) (stating 
that the Fourth Amendment was created to prohibit the English practice of allowing local 
officials to forcibly enter a colonist’s home, search it, and smuggle goods out of it, as well as 
to have the government honor the dignity of its citizens by issuing warrants before 
searches); David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian:  Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression 
in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795, 798–99 (1985) (explaining that past 
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to freedom of speech.12  The First Amendment was enacted to eliminate 
all barriers that quieted political speech and to stimulate the unrestricted 
transfer of ideas throughout society.13  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
has narrowed the construction of the First Amendment by creating 
different groups of speech, each of which have their own specific level of 
protection.14  However, the Supreme Court has had trouble fitting 
commercial speech into any existing First Amendment category and, in 
turn, has created multiple contradictory standards for the commercial 
speech doctrine.15 
Part II.A of this Note examines the protection that commercial 
speech has historically received under the First Amendment, the 
                                                                                                             
historians have concluded that the First Amendment gave Americans “remarkable 
freedom, which ‘spurred an expanding legacy of liberty’” and was regarded “as a 
prerequisite to the republican government”). 
12 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 922–23 (3d 
ed. 2006) (articulating that the First Amendment was a reaction to the suppression of 
speech that existed in England through an elaborate licensing system, seditious libel laws, 
and criminal sanctions). 
13 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1269 (2007) 
(stating that the First Amendment was created in order to prohibit the government from 
“assessing laws that regulate speech on the basis of content, as well as for scrutinizing 
content-based exclusions of speakers from public fora and of the press from criminal 
trials”).  But see Paul S. Zimmerman, Hanging Up on Commercial Speech:  Moser v. FCC, 71 
WASH. L. REV. 571, 590 (1996) (arguing that some courts have ignored content-based laws 
when the issue before them has concerned commercial speech and that this “selective basis 
contains within it a greater possibility for discrimination”). 
14 See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (holding that 
government speech must only meet rational basis scrutiny to be upheld under the First 
Amendment); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (finding that the 
expression derived from nude dancing is at the outer limits of the First Amendment and 
can be totally banned in public due to its secondary effects); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 
U.S. 539, 558 (1976) (concluding that prior restraints, such as laws restricting publication 
and licensing systems, carry a “heavy presumption” against constitutional validity); 
Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that a conviction for incitement of 
illegal activity is constitutional if there is imminent harm to society, a likelihood that illegal 
action will imminently occur, and if the defendant had the intent to cause illegality). 
15 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I 
continue to believe that when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to 
suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in 
question may be characterized as ‘commercial.’”); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 
U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Since I do not believe we have before us the 
wherewithal to declare Central Hudson wrong—or at least the wherewithal to say what 
ought to replace it—I must resolve this case in accord with our existing jurisprudence . . . .  
[However,] I am not disposed to develop new law, or reinforce old, on this issue, and 
accordingly I merely concur in the judgment of the Court.”); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 
514 U.S. 476, 497–98 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“In my opinion, the Government’s 
asserted interest, that consumers should be misled or uninformed for their own protection, 
does not suffice to justify restrictions on protected speech in any context, whether under 
‘exacting scrutiny’ or some other standard.”). 
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subsequent landmark cases that created the commercial speech doctrine, 
and the construction of the Central Hudson test.16  Next, Part II.B charts 
how the Central Hudson test has been applied to diverse classes of 
advertising and different mediums by which advertising is 
disseminated.17  Subsequently, Part II.B.1 and Part II.B.2 inspect how the 
Court has interpreted the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson 
test, respectively.18  Part II.C goes on to address the crisis of binge 
drinking on collegiate campuses, the types of policies that many 
universities have adopted to combat this trend, and the steps the 
government has taken to quell this growing societal problem.19  Finally, 
Part II.C.1 and Part II.C.2 outline the facts, holdings, and reasonings in 
the conflicting decisions Pitt News v. Pappert and Educational Media Co. at 
Virginia Tech v. Swecker.20 
A. The Evolution of the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
The First Amendment expressly states that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”21  Despite the 
unambiguous language of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court 
refused to recognize commercial speech as a protected form of 
expression before 1976.22  Subsequently, however, the Court has held 
                                                 
16 See infra Part II.A (providing a background of the creation and advancement of the 
commercial speech doctrine). 
17 See infra Part II.B (discussing the various ways the commercial speech doctrine has 
been applied since the Central Hudson test was formed). 
18 See infra Part II.B.1 and Part II.B.2 (discussing the interpretations of the third and 
fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test after 1980). 
19 See infra Part II.C (outlining the problems that have occurred as a result of the binge 
drinking epidemic on American college campuses and the different avenues taken to curb 
this startling pattern). 
20 See infra Part II.C.1 and Part II.C.2 (discussing the background on the Third and 
Fourth Circuits’ differing opinions on the issue of commercial speech as applied to alcohol 
advertisements in collegiate newspapers). 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
22 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that states may 
constitutionally regulate advertising that is purely commercial); see also Breard v. City of 
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642–43 (1951) (finding that state prohibitions on door-to-door 
solicitation was constitutional); Ad-Express, Inc. v. Kirvin, 516 F.2d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(holding that a city could ban the distribution of leaflets left on residential doorsteps 
because “the Constitution imposes no restraint on government with respect to purely 
commercial advertising in the public streets”); Stevenson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 
Tex., 393 F. Supp. 812, 819 (W.D. Tex. 1975) (concluding that a graduate student’s speech in 
a television commercial was not protected because his representations concerning the 
device were neither “scientific [nor] educational [in] nature”); Thomas H. Jackson & John 
Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech:  Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. 
L. REV. 1, 2 (1979) (stating that commercial speech is recognized as less protected under the 
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that the First Amendment protects not only the right to free expression, 
but the “right to ‘receive information and ideas.’”23  In the commercial 
context, the Court advanced this theory in the landmark case Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.24  In that 
case, the Court held that pharmacists could advertise their prescription 
prices in newspapers, despite the government’s substantial interest in 
upholding the professional standards and ethics of the pharmaceutical 
industry.25  This decision was founded on the right of consumers to 
receive truthful information about products in the “marketplace of 
ideas.”26 
                                                                                                             
First Amendment because courts have made a “distinction between the market for ideas 
and the market for goods and services”). 
23 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757 
(1976) (holding that pharmacists have the constitutional right to advertise prices in 
newspapers); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972) (stating the “First 
Amendment right to ‘receive information and ideas’”); see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 
809, 822 (1975) (holding that an abortion advertisement published in a newspaper was 
protected speech under the First Amendment because it did more than propose a 
commercial transaction, “[i]t contained factual material of clear ‘public interest’” that was 
of “value to a diverse audience—not only to readers possibly in need of the services 
offered, but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the subject 
matter”).  But see Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets:  Compelled Commercial Speech 
and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 555, 583 (2006) (arguing that commercial speech is a qualified right because the 
doctrine was built around the idea that consumers have the right to hear a commercial 
message and that commercial speakers lack strong independent constitutional interests). 
24 425 U.S. at 773.  “[A] [s]tate may [not] completely suppress the dissemination of 
concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information’s 
effect upon its disseminators and its recipients.”  Id. 
25 Id. at 770.  The Court held “that high professional standards . . . are guaranteed by the 
close regulation to which pharmacists in Virginia are subject. . . . Surely, any pharmacist 
guilty of professional dereliction that actually endangers his customer will promptly lose 
his license.”  Id. at 768–69. 
26 Id. at 770.  The Court explained “that people will perceive their own best interests if 
only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to [achieving] that end is to 
open the channels of communication rather than to close them.”  Id.  Further, the Court 
stated that “[a]dvertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is 
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what 
product . . . at what price. . . . It is a matter of public interest that [private economic] 
decisions . . . be intelligent and well informed.”  Id. at 765.  Therefore, the Court noted that 
“the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.”  Id.  Some Justices support the 
protection of commercial speech in the marketplace because “[i]f the individual is to 
achieve the maximum degree of material satisfaction permitted by his resources, he must 
be presented with as much information as possible concerning the relative merits of 
competing products.”  Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:  
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 433 (1971).  
This is because “advertising serves a legitimate educational function in that it is ‘an 
immensely powerful instrument for the elimination of ignorance . . . .’”  Id.  Moreover, the 
marketplace of ideas theory, which holds, “the best test of truth is the power of the thought 
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Likewise, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court held that a blanket 
suppression of advertisements providing prices for legal services was 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.27  More importantly, the 
Court carved out three critical exceptions to the dissemination of 
commercial speech under the First Amendment.  First, commercial 
statements are unprotected if they are false or can be construed to 
mislead or deceive recipients of the message.28  Second, legislatures may 
enact laws that restrict the time, place, and manner of commercial 
speech.29  Lastly, commercial speech advertising illegal activity is 
unprotected.30 
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission of New 
York, the Court attempted to deviate from a case-by-case analysis of the 
newly minted commercial speech doctrine by creating a structured test 
to examine commercial speech.31  In Central Hudson, the New York Public 
Service Commission ordered Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation 
to stop all advertising that promoted the use of electricity.32  The Public 
                                                                                                             
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground 
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out,” supports the protection of consumers’ 
rights.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). 
27 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).  “[T]he flow of such information may not be restrained, 
and . . . the disciplinary rule against appellants [is] violative of the First Amendment.”  Id. 
28 See id. at 383 (“Advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading of course is subject to 
restraint.”); see also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15–16 (1979) (holding that a law 
restricting optometrists from associating their names with any optometrical office they did 
not work at was constitutional because there was a significant possibility that names of the 
optometrists on the offices would be used to mislead the public); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 464–65 (1978) (holding that attorneys do not have a constitutional right 
to personally solicit victims of accidents in the hospital because “the very plight of that 
person not only makes him more vulnerable to influence [like that of a lawyer] but also 
may make advice all the more intrusive”). 
29 See Bates, 433 U.S. at 384 (holding that “reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and 
manner of [commercial] advertising” are acceptable). 
30 See id. (holding that illegal advertisements may be suppressed); see also Pittsburgh 
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (concluding 
that a newspaper could not publish want ads for employers that sexually discriminated in 
the job description because a city ordinance prohibited any employer from publishing or 
causing to be published any advertisement indicating sex discrimination). 
31 See Shannon M. Hinegardner, Note, Abrogating the Supreme Court’s De Facto Rational 
Basis Standard for Commercial Speech:  A Survey and Proposed Revision of the Third Central 
Hudson Prong, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 523, 533 (2009) (suggesting that the Court failed to 
create a concrete test to evaluate commercial speech cases before Central Hudson); see also 
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 629–
30 (1990) (expressing that the Court could not decide what level of scrutiny to apply to 
cases involving the commercial speech doctrine—let alone the elements for a rigid test—in 
the interim between Bates and Central Hudson). 
32 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 558–59 
(1980). 
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Service Commission issued this instruction to protect the best interests of 
the public by promoting the conservation of energy and to minimize the 
chances that the public would incur higher rates.33 
The Court began its analysis by defining commercial speech as 
expression that is solely related to the economic interest of the speaker.34  
By examining prior case law, the Court created a four-pronged test that 
could be applied to cases concerning the right to free speech in the 
commercial context.  First, the expression being restricted must be 
protected by the First Amendment.35  Second, the government’s interest 
must be substantial.36  Third, the restriction on speech must directly 
advance the interest that the government asserted.37  Lastly, the 
restriction on speech must not be more extensive than necessary to serve 
the government’s substantial interests.38 
In applying this test to the Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corporation, the Court held that the first and second prongs were 
satisfied.39  Furthermore, the government met the third prong because 
                                                 
33 Id. at 559.  The Court found that the Public Service Commission of New York 
“declared all promotional advertising [of energy] contrary to the national policy of 
conserving energy,” and that the Public Service Commission deemed Central Hudson Gas 
& Electric Corporation’s advertising scheme to be promotional; which was advertising 
targeted at stimulating the purchase of utility services.  Id.  Further, the Public Service 
Commission of New York argued that the promotional advertising could raise the cost of 
utilities’ prices because the rates on electricity were not based on marginal costs.  Id. at 568–
69.  Therefore, if electricity consumption increased during peak hours, the rates would not 
reflect the true costs of expanding production of the electricity.  Id.  Moreover, these extra 
costs would be paid by the consumer, not Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation.  Id. 
at 569. 
34  See id. at 579 (“[C]ommercial speech [is] ‘expression related solely to the economic 
interests of the speaker and its audience.’”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1529 (9th ed. 
2009) (defining commercial speech as “[c]ommunication (such as advertising and 
marketing) that involves only the commercial interests of the speaker and the audience, 
and is therefore afforded lesser First Amendment protection than social, political, or 
religious speech”).  But see Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983) 
(holding that whether or not speech is determined to be commercial is figured by weighing 
the following factors:  (1) whether the speaker proposes a commercial transaction; (2) 
whether the speaker concedes that the speech is an advertisement; (3) whether the speaker 
references a specific product; and (4) whether the speaker has an economic motivation). 
35 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.  The Court stated that, “[f]or commercial speech to come 
within [the First Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be 




39 Id. at 566–69.  In regard to the first prong, the Court held that “[i]n the absence of 
factors that would distort the decision to advertise, [the Court] may assume that the 
willingness of a business to promote its products reflects a belief that consumers are 
interested in the advertising.”  Id. at 567–68.  The Court reasoned that, since consumers 
may need to know information to aid their decision to use a product, or how much of the 
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energy conservation could be directly advanced by the restriction on 
advertising.40  Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the government’s 
restriction was more extensive than necessary to further the state’s 
interest in energy conservation, and therefore struck down the Public 
Service Commission’s order prohibiting promotional advertising.41  
Following the Court’s decision in Central Hudson, the four-pronged test 
has been adapted to various other instances of commercial speech.42 
B. The Subsequent Expansion and Interpretation of the Central Hudson Test 
In the aftermath of Central Hudson, the Court has since attempted to 
define the contours of the commercial speech doctrine by applying the 
four-pronged test to limitations imposed on controversial 
advertisements of:  (1) alcohol products;43 (2) tobacco products;44 (3) 
                                                                                                             
product, the advertising in this case was constitutionally protected speech.  Id. at 567–72.  
The Court held that the states had two valid interests to protect in this case.  Id.  First, the 
state’s goal in conserving energy was substantial because “[i]n view of our country’s 
dependence on energy resources beyond our control, no one can doubt the importance of 
energy conservation.”  Id. at 568.  Further, the state had a second substantial interest in 
keeping rates fair and efficient.  Id. at 569. 
40 Id. at 569.  The Court held that the state’s interest in conserving energy was directly 
advanced by the restriction on promotional advertising because the increased advertising 
for electrical services would presumably lead to increased consumption of electricity.  Id.  
In rejecting the state’s argument, the Court held the assertion that the impact of 
promotional advertising would unfairly increase public rates was “tenuous” and “highly 
speculative.”  Id. 
41 Id. at 570.  The Court held that the Commission’s order was overbroad because it 
prevented utility companies from promoting energy services that would reduce electricity.  
Id.  Further, the Court concluded that the Commission could have alternatively required all 
utility service advertisements to contain efficiency and expense information within them, 
instead of totally banning all speech disseminated by utility companies to consumers.  Id. 
42 See infra Part II.B (detailing the use of the Central Hudson test in various cases 
concerning other products and services as well as in commercial speech cases pertaining to 
specific mediums). 
43 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489–90, 516 (1996) (holding that a 
state may not prohibit manufacturers, wholesalers, shippers, or retailers from advertising 
the price of alcoholic beverages; or completely disallow any newspaper, periodical, radio or 
television broadcaster from accepting, publishing, or broadcasting any advertisements for 
alcoholic beverages); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490–91 (1995) (finding that 
it is unconstitutional for the government to prevent brewers of beer from labeling the 
alcohol content on their product’s packaging, even though states have substantial interests 
in reducing alcohol consumption). 
44 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 534–35, 571 (2001) (holding that a 
state regulation prohibiting all outdoor tobacco advertising within 1,000 feet of any public 
playground, playground area in a public park, elementary school, or secondary school, and 
all point-of-sale advertising lower than five feet from the floor was unconstitutional 
because it prohibited protected speech from being heard by adults, even though the state 
had a substantial interest in preventing minors from using tobacco products). 
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gambling;45 (4) professional services;46 and (5) health care services.47  
Moreover, the Court has decided cases concerning the limitations on 
commercial advertisement delivered through mediums such as:  (1) 
signs;48 (2) billboards;49 (3) books; (4) magazines; (5) newspapers;50 (6) 
                                                 
45 See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195–96 (1999) 
(concluding that a federal statute was unconstitutional as applied when it prohibited 
commercial advertising for private casinos in states where gambling was legalized); United 
States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 435–36 (1993) (finding that Congress may 
constitutionally prohibit radio stations in non-gambling states from broadcasting lottery 
advertisements even if most of their listeners reside in pro-gambling states). 
46 See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (holding that a state’s thirty-
day ban on legal direct-mail solicitations to accident victims was constitutional because this 
policy limited the intrusion into the victims’ privacy and allowed the state to craft the 
standards of state-licensed lawyers); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l. Regulation, Bd. of 
Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 149 (1994) (finding that a state unconstitutionally imposed 
sanctions on an attorney for advertising as a certified public accountant, when the attorney 
was licensed under state law as an accountant); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993) 
(concluding that a state’s ban on direct, in-person, uninvited solicitations by certified public 
accountants was unconstitutional); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of 
Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 110–11 (1990) (holding that an attorney who advertised that his services 
were certified by the National Board of Trial Advocacy was protected by the First 
Amendment); In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 207 (1982) (finding that the provisions of a state 
supreme court rule regulating lawyer advertising that prohibited lawyers from identifying 
the jurisdictions in which the lawyer was licensed to practice violated the First 
Amendment). 
47 See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 377 (2002) (finding that a federal 
regulation prohibiting advertising and promotion of particular compounded drugs was 
unconstitutional); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 80 (1983) (holding that 
a law that prohibited sending unsolicited information concerning contraceptives through 
the mail was unconstitutional under the First Amendment); see also Carey v. Population 
Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 678–82, 700–01 (1977) (concluding that a state law that banned the 
advertising and display of contraceptives was unconstitutional under the First Amendment 
when applied to a direct-mail, non-medical contraceptive devices company); Va. State Bd. 
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–73 (1976) (finding 
that a state law restricting pharmacists from advertising prices of pharmaceutical 
medication was unconstitutional). 
48 See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 86, 97 (1977) (holding 
that a township ordinance banning “For Sale” or “Sold” signs was unconstitutional). 
49  See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 502 (1981) (concluding that 
the First Amendment protects the communicative and expressive aspects of billboards, just 
like any other medium of communication that combines communicative and non-
communicative features). 
50 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429–31 (1993) (holding 
that a city’s revocation of a permit to place newsracks dispensing the plaintiff’s free 
magazines, which consisted primarily of advertisements for services, was unconstitutional 
because the city did not have a reasonable fit between its interests of improving aesthetics 
and safety and the restriction of commercial handbills); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985) (concluding that commercial 
illustrations in newspapers are entitled to the same First Amendment protections given to 
verbal speech). 
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mail;51 (7) radio and oral communications;52 and (8) television 
broadcasting.53  However, while expanding this doctrine, the Court has 
employed numerous standards to interpret the Central Hudson test, and, 
in turn, this approach has created uncertainty over how the First 
Amendment should be applied to commercial speech cases.54 
1. The Court’s Interpretation of Central Hudson’s Third Prong 
The third prong of the Central Hudson test requires that a restriction 
on commercial speech must directly advance the substantial interest the 
government asserts.55  To directly advance the government’s substantial 
interest, the government has the burden of proving that the law 
restricting speech materially mitigates a cited injury to the public.56  
Although the government can use broad evidentiary sources to prove its 
interest is advanced, the government may not satisfy this prong by 
                                                 
51 See Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 635 (holding that a state’s thirty-day ban on legal direct-mail 
solicitations to accident victims was constitutional because this policy limited the intrusion 
into victims’ privacy and allowed the state to craft the standards of state-licensed lawyers); 
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 79–80 (holding that a law that prohibited sending unsolicited information 
concerning contraceptives through the mail was unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment); Carey, 431 U.S. at 678, 700 (holding that a state law that banned the 
advertising and display of contraceptives was unconstitutional under the First Amendment 
when applied to a direct-mail, non-medical contraceptive devices company). 
52 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 720, 732–33 (1990) (holding that it was 
reasonable to restrict the access to postal premises for purposes of solicitation when an 
organization asked for contributions, sold books and subscriptions to the organization’s 
newspaper, and distributed literature on a variety of political issues because the solicitation 
was inherently disruptive of the postal service’s business); Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of 
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 469, 485–86 (1989) (reversing and remanding an appellate court 
decision upholding a state school rule prohibiting private commercial enterprises from 
operating in public university facilities). 
53 See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 173, 195–96 
(1999) (holding that a federal statute was unconstitutional as applied when it prohibited 
radio and television commercial advertising for private casinos in states where gambling 
was legalized).  But see United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 435–36 (1993) 
(finding that Congress may constitutionally prohibit radio stations in a non-gambling state 
from broadcasting lottery advertisements, even if most of their listeners reside in a pro-
gambling state). 
54 See infra Part II.B.1 and II.B.2 (describing the use of the material degree and common 
sense standards for the third prong of the Central Hudson test and the establishment of the 
least restrictive means and reasonable fit standards in regard to the fourth prong). 
55 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
56 See Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 626 (holding that the state has the burden of proof to show that 
commercial speech is actually harmful); see also Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569 (suggesting 
that speculative evidence is not enough to satisfy the third prong of the Central Hudson 
test). 
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relying on mere speculation or conjecture.57  Further, the law will not be 
upheld if it provides insufficient support for the government’s purpose,58 
or if there is little chance that the law can advance the government’s 
interest.59 
In attempting to define the evidentiary threshold necessary to 
comply with Central Hudson’s third prong, the Court held in Lorillard 
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly that the government may authorize speech 
restrictions based solely on history, consensus, and simple common 
sense.60  Additionally, in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., the Court stated 
                                                 
57 See Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 626, 628 (holding that the government did not satisfy its 
evidentiary burden because it “[did] not disclose any anecdotal evidence . . . that 
validate[d] the [government’s] suppositions” and that the Court would not read prior “case 
law to require that empirical data come to [the Court] accompanied by [excessive] 
background information” (alterations in original)); Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Free 
Speech, Fleeting Expletives, and the Causation Quagmire:  Was Justice Scalia Wrong in Fox 
Television Stations?, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 737, 773 (2010) (suggesting that empirical 
evidence must be coupled with moral and social concerns to properly adjudicate issues 
arising under the third prong of the Central Hudson test). 
58 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993). 
59 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 566 (2001). 
60 See id. at 555 (expressing that history, consensus, and simple common sense was 
sufficient evidence to justify strict scrutiny in prior strict scrutiny cases); see also Fla. Bar, 515 
U.S. at 628 (suggesting history, consensus, and simple common sense would satisfy the 
intermediate scrutiny standard set forth in the Central Hudson test); Alexander v. Cahill, 598 
F.3d 79, 92–94 (2d Cir. 2010) (advocating for the strong view of the common sense 
standard); Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 589–90 (4th Cir. 2010) (using the 
logical nexus approach to the common sense standard to conclude that alcohol advertising 
causes an increase in binge drinking); WV Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. 
Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 303, 305 (4th Cir. 2009) (applying the logical nexus approach to the 
common sense standard to hold that video advertising at casinos may cause gambling 
addicts to compulsively spend money); IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 57–59 (1st 
Cir. 2008) (adopting the legislative deference view to the simple common sense standard); 
Pagan v. Fruchey, 492 F.3d 766, 777 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the strong common sense 
standard is the appropriate approach); G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 
1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006) (adopting the legislative deference standard to hold that 
legislative deliberation, a dynamic dialogue with the city’s residents and businesses, 
extensive hearings, and a city council’s reliance on the experience of other cities were 
sufficient evidence to institute a commercial sign restriction on certain sizes, types, and 
designs of signs on city roads); Pac. Frontier v. Pleasant Grove City, 414 F.3d 1221, 1235 
(10th Cir. 2005) (supporting the strong view approach in applying the common sense 
standard to invalidate a city’s ordinance establishing a solicitor’s licensing procedure 
because it violated the plaintiff’s First Amendment commercial speech rights); Missouri ex 
rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 654–55 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
legislative deference standard was the correct interpretation of the common sense 
standard, and proving that legislative findings showed that prohibitions on unsolicited 
commercial fax advertisements directly and materially advanced the government’s 
asserted interest); Mason v. Fla. Bar, 208 F.3d 952, 957 (11th Cir. 2000) (expressing that the 
strong view approach to the common sense standard was correct and that “the Supreme 
Court has not accepted ‘common sense’ alone to prove the existence of a concrete, non-
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that references to studies and personal accounts of particular incidents 
could potentially meet the government’s burden of proof.61  The 
government has even been given the power to combine reports and 
anecdotes from different locales to justify the government’s interest.62  
Like Central Hudson’s third prong, the fourth prong of the analysis has 
also been subject to multiple interpretations.63 
2. The Court’s Interpretation of Central Hudson’s Fourth Prong 
Initially, the Court declared that the fourth prong of the Central 
Hudson test requires that a restriction on commercial speech be no more 
extensive than necessary to serve the government’s substantial 
interests.64  The Court has redefined this standard to mean that the 
government restriction must be accomplished by the least restrictive 
means possible.65  Currently, however, the Court has stated that 
                                                                                                             
speculative harm”); Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism:  Quasi-Neutral Principles and 
Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115, 132 (2003) (arguing that conflicting empirical data 
can hinder courts from deciding cases consistently). 
61 515 U.S. at 624.  The Florida Bar Court referenced City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 
Inc., which held that a city could justify zoning ordinances that required adult movie 
theaters to be 1,000 feet away from schools, parks, and churches in order “to prevent crime, 
protect the city’s retail trade, maintain property values, and generally ‘protec[t] and 
preserv[e] the quality of [the city’s] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of 
urban life.’”  Id.  (alterations in original) (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 
475 U.S. 41, 46, 48 (1986)).  In Renton, the Court held that, rather than conduct its own 
study, the city of Renton could base its substantial interest in reducing crime, protecting 
trade, and preserving property values to rezone an adult theater by referencing a twenty-
year-old study created by the city of Detroit.  Renton, 475 U.S. at 50–51.  The Court has also 
held that empirical evidence does not have to necessarily be obtained to win a free speech 
case.  FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1812–13 (2009). 
62 Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 628. 
63 See infra Part II.B.2 (demonstrating that the Court has used both the least restrictive 
means standard and the reasonable fit standard to adjudicate the fourth prong of the 
Central Hudson test). 
64 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980) (stating that, for the fourth prong, the Court will ask if the restriction on commercial 
speech “is not more extensive than is necessary to serve [the government’s] interest”); see 
also Andrew L. Howell, Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.:  What Scrutiny Should be 
Applied to Government Regulations on Truthful Commercial Speech?, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1089, 
1094 (1994) (stating that the no more than necessary standard currently “lies somewhere 
between a ‘rational basis’ test and a ‘least restrictive means’ test”). 
65 See 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996) (holding that a pricing ban 
on all alcohol advertising was unconstitutional since “alternative forms of regulation that 
would not involve any restrictions on speech [such as the maintenance of higher price, the 
rationing of per capita purchases, or the use of educational campaigns focused on drinking 
problems] would be more likely to achieve the [s]tate’s goal of promoting temperance”); 
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995) (“The FAAA’s defects are further 
highlighted by the availability of alternatives that would prove less intrusive to the First 
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prohibitions on commercial speech do not have to be achieved by the 
least restrictive means possible.66  For example, in Board of Trustees v. Fox, 
the Court declared that a state may not prohibit commercial speech by 
purporting to have a mere rational basis.67  Rather, the government must 
demonstrate that there is a fit between the legislature’s ends and the 
means chosen to accomplish those ends.68  This fit does not need to be 
perfect, nor does it necessarily have to represent the single least 
restrictive means taken to achieve that end.69  Thus, as expressed in 
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States, restrictions must 
be narrowly drawn to regulate speech only to the extent that the 
restriction would further the state’s substantial objective.70  A good 
example of the tension between competing interpretations of the Central 
                                                                                                             
Amendment’s protections for commercial speech.” (emphasis added)); see also Eugene 
Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1134 (2005) (arguing that the least 
restrictive means test will be met if it is an unavoidable side-effect of the restriction of 
harmful speech). 
66 See Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 479 (1989) (“[O]ur [past] 
decisions upholding the regulation of commercial speech cannot be reconciled with a 
requirement of least restrictive means.”); Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 
478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (“The last two steps of the Central Hudson analysis basically involve 
a consideration of the ‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to 
accomplish those ends.”). 
67 492 U.S. at 479.  Justice Blackman observed that: 
None of our cases invalidating the regulation of commercial speech 
involved a provision that went only marginally beyond what would 
adequately have served the governmental interest. . . . [A]lmost all of 
the restrictions disallowed under Central Hudson’s fourth prong have 
been substantially excessive, disregarding “far less restrictive and 
more precise means.” 
Id.; see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 418 n.13 (1993) 
(explaining that “we rejected mere rational-basis review” for judging restrictions on 
commercial speech).  But see Hinegardner, supra note 31, at 529–30 (“[T]he ‘common sense’ 
rationale . . . [automatically] creates a de facto rational basis standard because ‘common 
sense’ provides absolutely no basis for the judiciary to review legislative decisions.”). 
68 See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341 (stating that the reasonable fit test was to be applied to the 
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test). 
69 See Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (“[A] fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that 
represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion 
to the interest served,’ that employs . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired 
objective.” (citation omitted)). 
70 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999).  The Court held that: 
The Government is not required to employ the least restrictive means 
conceivable, but it must demonstrate narrow tailoring of the 
challenged regulation to the asserted interest—“a fit that is not 
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the 
single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the 
interest served.” 
Id. 
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Hudson test can be seen in Pitt News v. Pappert and Educational Media Co. 
at Virginia Tech v. Swecker. 
C. The Pitt News v. Pappert and Educational Media Co. v. Swecker 
Decisions 
Before Pitt News and Swecker, a battle was brewing over binge 
drinking on college campuses.71  Within the past decade, several colleges 
throughout the United States have attempted to reign in student binge 
drinking following several incidents resulting in death,72 sexual abuse,73 
                                                 
71 See NIAAA Council Approves Definition of Binge Drinking, NAT’L INST. ALCOHOL ABUSE 
& ALCOHOLISM NEWSLETTER (Dep’t of Health & Human Servs./Nat’l Inst. of Health, 
Rockville, Md.), Winter 2004, at 3, available at http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/ 
Newsletter/winter2004/Newsletter_Number3.pdf (explaining that binge drinking is 
defined as a pattern of drinking that brings a person’s blood alcohol content to a level of 
0.08% or more within two hours).  Binge drinking typically occurs when adult men 
consume five or more drinks, or adult women consume four or more drinks, in about two 
hours and that drink is defined as one twelve-ounce beer, one five-ounce glass of wine, or 
one 1.5-ounce shot of distilled spirits.  Id.; see also William DeJong, The Role of Mass Media 
Campaigns in Reducing High-Risk Drinking among College Students, J. STUD. ALCOHOL, supp. 
no. 14, 2002 at 182, 183–85 (reviewing the informational advertising campaigns, social norm 
marketing campaigns, and advocacy campaigns that colleges utilize to reduce alcohol 
consumption and awareness through advertisements in newspapers, television, radio, and 
other mediums); Henry Wechsler, Jae Eun Lee, Meichun Kuo & Hang Lee, College Binge 
Drinking in the 1990s:  A Continuing Problem, 48 J. AM. C. HEALTH 199, 200, 202–03 (2000) 
(reporting that a survey, which included 119 colleges throughout the United States and 
more than 14,000 students, revealed that approximately two out of every five students 
(44%) were binge drinkers, 19% were abstainers, and 23% were frequent binge drinkers in 
1999); Evan Thomas, How to Fight Binge Drinking:  Would Lowering the Legal Age Help Colleges 
Curb Alcohol Abuse?, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 10, 2008), http://www.newsweek.com/2008/09/ 
10/how-to-fight-binge-drinking.html (reporting that 150 college presidents signed a letter 
to change the drinking age to eighteen so that minors are not as tempted to drink heavily). 
72 See Robert Davis, Five Binge-Drinking Deaths ‘Just the Tip of the Iceberg’, USA TODAY 
(Oct. 7, 2004), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2004-10-07-binge-usat_x.htm 
(reporting that five college student deaths had been linked to binge drinking in the first 
two months of the 2004 school year nationwide); Carey Goldberg, A Drinking Death Rattles 
Elite M.I.T.; Latest Fraternity Party Case Underscores Nationwide Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
1997, at A12 (reporting on the tragic death of a MIT freshman linked to binge drinking 
during a fraternity hazing ceremony); Ronald Smothers, Freshman’s Drinking Death Stuns a 
New Jersey University, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2007, at B2 (discussing the death of an eighteen-
year-old college student due to excessive alcohol consumption at a fraternity party at Rider 
University). 
73 Meichun Mohler-Kuo, George W. Dowdall, Mary P. Koss & Henry Wechsler, 
Correlates of Rape while Intoxicated in a National Sample of College Women, J. STUD. ALCOHOL, 
Jan. 2004, at 37, available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/cas/Documents/rapeintox/ 
037-Mohler-Kuo.sep1.pdf.  This study was conducted by the Department of Society, 
Human Development and Health, Harvard School of Public Health.  Id.  The researchers 
conducted evaluations at 119 schools and used a sample size of 215 randomly selected 
students at each school.  Id. at 38.  The study concluded that there is a strong correlation 
between rape and alcohol.  Id. at 43.  Specifically, roughly one in twenty college women 
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and violent riots.74  These have prompted universities to create a wide 
range of alcohol policies including:  (1) three strike rules;75 (2) zero-
tolerance regulations;76 (3) parental notification;77 and (4) alcohol 
advertising bans.78 
                                                                                                             
experienced rape; and intoxication increased a woman’s risk of being raped.  Id. at 42.  
Among those who experienced rape since the beginning of the school year, 72% of these 
women were so intoxicated that they were unable to consent.  Id. 
74 See Pat Borzi, On College Football Game Days, Efforts to Deter Binge Drinking, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/sports/ncaafootball/19drunk.html? 
_r=1 (reporting on the University of Minnesota’s new drinking policy mandating 
breathalyzer testing for all student football season ticket holders who have been ejected 
from a game, which was instituted because of extensive property damage and numerous 
arrests that occurred during past rioting on the campus in which excessive drinking was 
cited as a factor in the unruly behavior); Jenna Johnson, Crowded Off-Campus Party 
Degenerates into ‘War Zone’, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/12/AR2010041204291.html?hpid=topnews (reporting 
on an 8,000-person James Madison University Springfest party that turned into a riot after 
partygoers shattered car and house windows as well as threw rocks, beer bottles, and cans, 
injuring dozens of people). 
75 UNIV. OF R.I., STUDENT HANDBOOK, § 2.34, Minimum Mandatory Sanctions for Alcohol 
and Other Drug Violations:  Individual Students (2010), available at http://www.uri.edu/ 
judicial/assets/URI_Student_Handbook_2008-2010.pdf.  The University of Rhode Island’s 
alcohol policy states:  
Any student under the age of 21 who consumes and/or possesses 
alcohol in violation of Rhode Island law will be sanctioned as 
follows[:] . . . 
[F]irst offense, the mandatory minimum sanction will be completion 
of a self-assessment survey . . . and a minimum fine of $50. . . . 
[T]he second offense, within [three] semesters,  the mandatory 
minimum sanction will be mandatory education and evaluation and a 
minimum fine of $100. . . . 
[T]he third offense within three semesters [of the first offense], the 
mandatory minimum sanction will be suspension from the [u]niversity 
for two semesters with readmission possible on presentation of proof 
of treatment. 
Id. 
76 UNIV. OF COLO., STUDENT CONDUCT STUDENT CONDUCT CODE POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES, § 24, Possessing, using, providing, manufacturing, distributing, or selling alcoholic 
beverages in violation of law or university policies (2010―2011), available at 
http://www.colorado.edu/studentaffairs/studentconduct/downloads/StudentConduct 
PoliciesandProcedures.pdf.  The University of Colorado’s alcohol policy states that it 
applies to “an underage student . . . who knew, or reasonably should have known, s/he 
was in the presence of alcoholic beverages, or possessed, displayed, or was in the presence 
of an alcohol container or containers” and that “[i]n the case of a student who is found 
responsible via the student conduct process to have endangered the health, safety, or 
welfare of an individual through the provision of alcohol, the minimum disciplinary 
sanction shall be suspension.”  Id.; see also Drug and Alcohol Policy, TEX. LUTHERAN UNIV. 
(2010), http://www.tlu.edu/podium/default.aspx?t=6648&tn=Drug+and+Alcohol+Policy 
&lid=33689&ptid=129339&pttid=2&sdb=1 (citing the Texas Lutheran University alcohol 
policy, which states that “[t]he university will impose a minimum disciplinary penalty of 
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Nevertheless, many reporters and scholars have criticized the 
ineffectiveness of these collegiate alcohol policies as well as the methods 
used to enforce them.79  In response to the alleged failure of these alcohol 
polices, many cities and states have enacted ordinances, regulations, and 
statutes, some of which are related to alcohol advertising.80  Currently, 
                                                                                                             
suspension for a specified period of time or suspension of rights and privileges, or both, for 
conduct related to the use, possession, or distribution of drugs that are prohibited by law”). 
77 UNIV. OF MO., COLLECTED RULES AND REGULATIONS, 180.025, Parental Notification of 
Alcohol and Controlled Substances Violations (2010).  The University of Missouri’s alcohol 
policy states: 
The [u]niversity may notify only parent(s) or legal guardian(s) who 
have not declined to participate in the parental notification program 
under the following conditions:  (a) if the student is under 21 years of 
age at the time of disclosure; and (b) when the student has been 
determined under the Rules of Procedures in Student Conduct 
Matters, § 200.020 of the Collected Rules and Regulations of the 
University of Missouri to have violated the student conduct code 
concerning alcohol or controlled substances on campus including 
operating a vehicle . . . under the influence of alcohol . . . as prohibited 
by law of the state of Missouri as stated in § 200.010 B.8; and (c) the 
violation is an initial severe, second or a subsequent violation of the 
student conduct code concerning alcohol or controlled substances.  An 
initial severe offense is one that . . . endangers self, or others, or that 
may result in the potential loss of campus housing privileges, or have 
an impact on student status.  (d) the University reserves the right not 
to notify parent(s) or legal guardian(s) even though the above 
conditions are satisfied, upon the written recommendation of a health 
care provider who determines that such notification would not be in 
the best interest of the student and would be detrimental to the 
student’s health, safety or welfare. 
Id. 
78 See Vivian B. Faden & Marcy L. Baskin, An Evaluation of College Online Alcohol-Policy 
Information, 51(3) J. AM. C. HEALTH 101, 104 (2002), available at http://www.collegedrinking 
prevention.gov/CollegePresidents/evalCollegeAlcoholPolicies.aspx (stating  that twenty-
nine of the top fifty-two ranked universities in the nation had some kind of advertising 
restrictions that promoted an anti-alcohol policy and nineteen specifically prohibited 
advertisements from mentioning alcohol). 
79 See David J. Hanson, Effective and Ineffective College Alcohol Policies, ALCOHOL 
PROBLEMS & SOLUTIONS, http://www2.potsdam.edu/hansondj/youthissues/1131472758. 
html (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (criticizing universities’ “‘tough on drinking’” policies that 
ban all beer sales and punish non-drinkers caught at parties where alcohol is present); Tara 
Parker-Pope, Party Colleges Do Little to Curb Drinking, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2009), 
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/colleges-do-little-to-curb-drinking/?scp=9& 
sq=alcohol%20fight%20college&st=cse (stating that college alcohol policies focus on 
alcohol education programs but ought to educate students about how their drinking habits 
compare to those of other students and to show them that regular excessive drinking is not 
the norm). 
80 See David C. Newman, Wellesley Zero-Tolerance Alcohol Policy May Be Ineffective, HARV. 
CRIMSON (Dec. 1, 1999), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1999/12/1/wellesley-zero-
tolerance-alcohol-policy-may-be/ (criticizing a city ordinance that permits police officers to 
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only two states have statutes aimed at reducing alcohol products from 
being advertised in conjunction with education-related activities.81  
However, several states have promulgated regulations that prohibit or 
restrict advertisements that encourage the use, sale, consumption, or 
distribution of alcohol in the educational setting.82  These state statutes 
                                                                                                             
issue a summons to underage drinkers for their first offense); Social Host Ordinance Produces 
Unintended Consequences, DAILY NEXUS (June 3, 2010), http://www.dailynexus.com/2010-
06-03/social-host-ordinance-produces-unintended-consequences/ (stating that the city of 
Isla Vista’s new ordinance lacks clear guidelines to prevent the law from being unduly 
directed at the Isla Vista community and will primarily affect UCSB and SBCC students); 
see also David Vladeck, Gerald Weber & Lawrence O. Gostin, Commercial Speech and the 
Public’s Health:  Regulating Advertisements of Tobacco, Alcohol, High Fat Foods and Other 
Potentially Hazardous Products, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 32, 32 (2004) (acknowledging that 
many laws that ban advertising for products that diminish public health stem from 
legislators’ beliefs that advertisers’ inherent advantages in funding and control over the 
message drown out competing public health statements). 
81 See 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-498(e)(3) (West 2003) (effective Feb. 7, 2003) 
(prohibiting print advertisements of alcoholic beverages within three hundred feet of any 
church, school, or public playground); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-2109(e) (West 2009) 
(effective July 1, 2009) (permitting advertising on the rear of school buses but expressly 
prohibiting any alcohol or tobacco advertisements). 
82 See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6C1-2.003(2)(b) (2010) (prohibiting advertisements for 
the use, sale, consumption, or distribution of alcohol including:  (1) two-for-one specials; (2) 
beat-the-clock deals; (3) happy hours; (4) lady’s night; or (5) illustrations or photos 
depicting these activities at the University of Florida); 905 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-38-2 (2010) 
(prohibiting a primary supplier, wholesaler, or salesman of alcoholic beverages or the 
holder of a retailer’s or dealer’s permit to sell alcoholic beverages from erecting or 
maintaining any sign advertising alcoholic beverages within two hundred feet of a church 
or school); 4 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2S.1006(c) (2010) (banning alcoholic beverage advertising 
in any programs for events or activities in connection with any elementary or secondary 
schools and prohibiting any alcoholic beverages advertising connected with these events 
when broadcast over radio or television); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4301:1-1-44(D)(1) (2010) 
(forbidding billboard advertisements within five hundred feet of any church, school, or 
public playground); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 81-1-17(2)(j)(iv) (2010) (prohibiting alcohol 
advertisements directed at or appealing primarily to minors by placing advertising in any 
school, college or university magazine, newspaper, program, television program, radio 
program, or other media, or sponsoring any school, college, or university activity); 3 VA. 
ADMIN. CODE § 5-20-40(2)(2010) (prohibiting advertisements of alcoholic beverages in 
college student publications unless in reference to a dining establishment); WASH. ADMIN. 
CODE § 314-52-070 (2010) (prohibiting outdoor advertising of liquor placed within five 
hundred feet of schools where the administrative body of these schools object to such 
placement, or any place which the Liquor Control Board, in its discretion, finds contrary to 
the public interest); W. VA. CODE R. § 126-23-3 (2010) (prohibiting all alcohol and tobacco 
advertisements on any school property).  But see MICH. ADMIN CODE r. 436.1861 (2010) 
(permitting brewers, vendors of spirits, wine makers, out-of-state sellers of beer and wine, 
and licensed wholesalers of beer or wine to advertise in any newspaper or periodical 
published or circulated on the campus of a two- or four-year college or university located 
in the state); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0100-03-.03 (2010) (limiting advertising of distilled 
spirits and wines to brand names and only by direct mail and/or email; and narrowing 
advertising of distilled spirits, wines, and alcoholic beverages to newsletters, catalogues, or 
similar communications). 
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and local regulations have led to litigation and conflicting opinions in 
many jurisdictions.83 
1. The Pitt News Opinion 
Pitt News is an independent, student-run newspaper at the 
University of Pittsburgh that is published daily during the school year 
and weekly during the summer.84  The publication is distributed free of 
charge to students and staff at over seventy-five locations around the 
university’s campus.85  The paper is governed by a student publications 
board, which selects an editor-in-chief, who has final editorial control 
over any content in the paper.86  The publication follows a fifty-fifty 
formula, whereby half of the paper is devoted to news content and the 
other half to advertisements.87 
In 1996, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted an amendment to the 
state Liquor Code known as Act 199.88  The Act prohibited all alcohol 
advertisements that were in any way linked to an educational institution 
or directed at minors.89  The Act banned advertisements in almost all 
                                                 
83 Compare Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that a 
state statute prohibiting alcohol advertising on collegiate campuses was constitutional), 
with Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a state statute 
prohibiting alcohol advertising on collegiate campuses was unconstitutional). 
84 Pitt News, 379 F.3d at 101.  The Pitt News is a student-run publication, created by the 
University Board of Trustees, which represents the independent speech of students, and is 
not an official publication disseminated on behalf of the public university.  Id.   
85 Id.  In fall 1997, the University of Pittsburgh had 25,461 students on its campus and 
employed 7,742 faculty members and staff.  Brief of Appellant at 6, Pitt News v. Pappert, 
379 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1725), 2003 WL 24302476.  At that time, over seventy-five 
percent of the university’s population was over the age of twenty-one.  Id.  Many local 
people outside of the university were also  readers of the publication.  Id. 
86 Id. at 5. 
87 Id. at 6.  Due to this format, and because advertising represents Pitt News’s sole source 
of revenue, the length of the paper is directly determined by the amount of advertising 
sales.  Id.  In the 1998–99 school year, the budget for Pitt News was $603,000.  Id. 
88 Pitt News, 379 F.3d at 102. 
89 47 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4-498(e)(4)–(5) (West 1997 & Supp. 2011).  The statute stated: 
(e) The following shall apply to all alcoholic beverage and malt 
beverage advertising: 
 . . . . 
(4) The use in any advertisement of alcoholic beverages of any subject 
matter, language or slogan directed to minors to promote consumption 
of alcoholic beverages is prohibited.  Nothing in this section shall be 
deemed to restrict or prohibit any advertisement of alcoholic beverages 
to those persons of legal drinking age. 
(5) No advertisement shall be permitted, either directly or indirectly, in 
any booklet, program book, yearbook, magazine, newspaper, 
periodical, brochure, circular or other similar publication published by, 
for or on behalf of any educational institution. 
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forms of media.90  Act 199 was interpreted by state officials to apply only 
to advertisers who paid for their advertisements in the mediums 
proscribed by the law.91 
On December 9, 1997, the general manager of the Pitt News received 
a fax from the owner of Fuel & Fuddle, a local restaurant, canceling the 
establishment’s advertising contract with the paper.92  Fuel & Fuddle 
terminated the contract because the Bureau of Liquor Control 
Enforcement sent a letter to the restaurant notifying the business that it 
could be fined or have its alcohol license revoked for placing 
advertisements for alcoholic beverages in a newspaper published by an 
educational institution.93  To protect its advertisers, Pitt News stopped 
accepting all alcoholic beverage advertisements.94 
Subsequently, Pitt News filed a complaint against state officials, and 
the case eventually reached the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.95  There, 
                                                                                                             
Id. 
90 47 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4-498(g).  The statute stated: 
[T]he term “advertisement” shall mean any advertising of alcoholic 
beverages through the medium of radio broadcast, television 
broadcast, newspapers, periodicals or other publication, outdoor 
advertisement or any other printed or graphic matter, including 
booklets, flyers or cards, or on the product label or attachment itself. 
Id.  The punishment for violating this Act was a fine of up to $500 for the first offense and a 
mandatory jail sentence of three months for each subsequent offense.  Id. § 4-494(a). 
91 Pitt News, 379 F.3d at 102.  Faith Diehl, a representative of the Pennsylvania Liquor 
Control Board, testified that Title 47, section 4-498 of the Pennsylvania code only applied to 
advertisers, and not the media.  Id.  Further, she testified that, to be convicted under this 
section, the media publishing the advertisement had to receive compensation for 
placement of that advertisement.  Id. 
92 Id. at 103. 
93 Id.  Specifically, the letter stated that Fuel & Fuddle “had ‘advertised . . . alcoholic 
beverages, either directly or indirectly, in a publication published by, for or in [sic] behalf 
of an educational institution.’”  Id. (alteration in original).  Further, the Bureau of Liquor 
Control Enforcement threatened to suspend or revoke Fuel & Fuddle’s liquor license.  Id. 
94 Id.  In 1998, the practice of not accepting alcohol advertisements resulted in a $17,000 
operating loss for the paper which, consequently, affected its length.  Id. 
95 Id.  In April 1999, Pitt News filed a complaint and moved for a preliminary injunction 
against the enforcement of Act 199, alleging a violation of freedom of the press, freedom of 
expression, and equal protection of the law.  Id.  Initially, the district court denied the 
injunction request, holding that Pitt News lacked standing.  Id.  On appeal, a panel of the 
Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the injunction on behalf of the paper’s 
advertisers and readers but held that Pitt News had standing for a First Amendment claim 
of its own.  Id.  Despite this finding of standing, the court subsequently held that Pitt News 
was unlikely to succeed on the merits and dismissed the case.  Id. at 104.  This case was 
then taken by the Third Circuit for review.  Id.  The Third Circuit held that, by passing Act 
199, the government aimed to discourage speech it deemed to have harmful content by 
imposing a financial burden on the paper.  Id. at 106.  Therefore, Act 199 had to satisfy the 
four-pronged Central Hudson test because it was a restriction on commercial speech.  Id.  
According to the court, Act 199 undisputedly passed the first and second prongs of the 
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the court held that the government had failed Central Hudson’s third 
prong because it did not prove that Act 199 alleviated underage drinking 
or alcohol abuse to a material degree.96  The court concluded that the 
government had relied on speculation and conjecture to prove that 
eliminating the advertisements in Pitt News would reduce underage 
drinking, thus failing to meet the requirements outlined by the third 
prong.97  Moreover, the court held that the government had not 
established a reasonable fit between the legislature’s ends and the 
narrowly tailored means chosen to accomplish those ends.98  The court 
concluded that Act 199 was severely over- and under-inclusive.99  
Furthermore, the court found that the government could have used 
alternative methods to fight underage drinking.100  Although important, 
                                                                                                             
Central Hudson test.  Id.  The court held that the first prong of the Central Hudson test was 
met because the speech Pitt News was disseminating was for the lawful sale of alcoholic 
beverages.  Id.  Also, Act 199 passed the second prong of the Central Hudson test because 
the government had a substantial interest in preventing minors from drinking alcohol.  Id. 
96 Id. at 107.  Act 199 only applied to media advertisements associated with educational 
institutions, and the government did not produce any evidence that the ban on the 
advertisements had any effect on curbing underage drinking.  Id.  Here, the court conceded 
that any alcohol advertising is likely to encourage alcohol consumption, but there must be 
some empirical evidence to show that the government’s strategy would actually result in 
less underage consumption.  Id. 
97 Id. at 107–08.  Regardless of the effect the advertisements in Pitt News have on 
underage drinkers, students would still be exposed to alcohol advertisements through the 
radio and television as well as other free weekly papers distributed throughout the city of 
Pittsburgh.  Id. at 107.  The court expressed that: 
Even if Pitt students do not see alcoholic beverage ads in The Pitt News, 
they will still be exposed to a torrent of beer ads on television and the 
radio, and they will still see alcoholic beverage ads in other 
publications . . . . The suggestion that the elimination of alcoholic 
beverage ads from The Pitt News and other publications connected 
with the [u]niversity will slacken the demand for alcohol by Pitt 
students is counterintuitive and unsupported . . . . 
Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id.  Act 199 prohibited seventy-five percent of the total population at the University of 
Pittsburgh from legally receiving information about alcoholic products that they were 
permitted to purchase.  Id.  Thus, the court concluded that Act 199, in effect, combated 
underage drinking by restricting speech targeted at adults.  Id.; see BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 1213 (over-inclusion describes legislation that extends 
beyond the class of people that it was intended to protect or regulate); Underinclusiveness, 
THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Underinclusiveness (last visited Nov. 10, 2010) (stating 
that under-inclusion occurs when legislation prohibits some conduct, but fails to prohibit 
other similar conduct). 
100 Pitt News, 379 F.3d at 108 n.8.  The court relied on a study conducted by the Harvard 
School of Public Health to conclude that enforcement of drinking laws was implemented in 
a half-hearted manner on college campuses.  Id. 
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Pitt News does not represent the only opinion on these facts.  A strikingly 
similar case, Educational Media Co. at Virginia Tech v. Swecker, came out of 
the Fourth Circuit. 
2. The Swecker Opinion 
Swecker involved two different collegiate newspapers, the Collegiate 
Times, published by Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 
and the Cavalier Daily, published by the University of Virginia.101  Both 
newspapers rely heavily on advertising to stay within their budget.102 
The Virginia Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control is a state 
agency that controls the importation and distribution of alcoholic 
beverages within Virginia.103  The Alcoholic Beverage Control Board 
promulgated Section 5-20-40(B)(3), which prohibited advertisements of 
alcoholic beverages in any college student publication.104  A college 
student publication is defined as any college or university publication 
that is:  (1) prepared, edited, or published primarily by students; (2) 
sanctioned as a curricular or extracurricular activity; and (3) distributed 
or intended to be distributed primarily to persons under twenty-one 
years of age.105 
                                                 
101 Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 587 (4th Cir. 2010).  Both the Collegiate Times 
and the Cavalier Daily are student-run newspapers that rely on advertising to operate.  Id.  
The Collegiate Times is owned by the Educational Media Company at Virginia Tech.  Brief of 
Appellees at 1, Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-1798), 2009 
WL 1399396.  The Collegiate Times is distributed free of charge to the Virginia Tech 
community and is available at select locations around campus.  Id. at 2.  The Collegiate Times 
is published four times a week and approximately 14,000 copies of the paper are circulated 
daily during the fall and spring semesters.  Id. at 1–2.  The Cavalier Daily is owned by The 
Cavalier Daily, Inc.  Id. at 2.  The Cavalier Daily is printed five days a week during the 
school year, and about 10,000 copies of the paper are distributed free of charge to the 
University of Virginia community each day.  Id.  Additionally, the Cavalier Daily is 
distributed free of charge to the community at campus locations as well as off-campus, at 
local restaurants near the University of Virginia.  Id. at 3.  As of September 2006, 49% of the 
on-grounds students at the University of Virginia were under the age of twenty-one, and 
51% of the students were over the age of twenty-one.  Id.  The paper’s readership also 
includes university faculty and staff, who are generally over the age of twenty-one.  Id. 
102 Id. at 6–7.  In 2005, 98.7% of the Collegiate Times’ budget came from advertising.  Id.   
103 Swecker, 602 F.3d at 586.  The Alcoholic Beverage Control Board serves three main 
functions:  (1) it is a law enforcement organization aimed at implementing Virginia’s 
alcohol laws; (2) it is an educational organization designed to inform citizens about the 
dangers of drinking; and (3) it is an administrative organization created to issue alcohol 
licenses as well as revoke and suspend them through proceedings in administrative courts.  
About ABC, VIRGINIA.GOV, http://www.abc.virginia.gov/admin/aboutabc.html (last 
visited Dec. 24, 2010). 
104 3 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-20-40 (B)(3) (2010), amended by 3 VA. ADMIN CODE § 5-20-
40(A)(2). 
105 Id. 
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As a result of this regulation, the Collegiate News and the Cavalier 
Daily each lost $30,000 in revenue.106  Both organizations filed a 
complaint alleging that their First Amendment rights had been 
violated.107  The Fourth Circuit held that Section 5-20-40(B)(3) was a 
constitutional restriction on commercial speech because it survived the 
four prongs of the Central Hudson test.108  The court held Section 5-20-
40(B)(3) met the first prong of the Central Hudson test because the law 
regulated truthful advertisements, which were lawfully directed at some 
students and faculty that were twenty-one years of age or older.109  
Additionally, the government met the second prong because the state 
had a substantial interest in combating underage drinking.110   Under the 
third prong of the Central Hudson test, the court found that the state’s ban 
on alcohol advertising in collegiate newspapers did directly advance the 
government’s substantial interest in eliminating underage alcohol 
consumption.111  The court reasoned that history, consensus, or simple 
common sense supported a causal link between the advancement of the 
government’s substantial interest and the advertising ban.112  Concerning 
the fourth prong of the analysis, the court held that there was a 
reasonable fit between the government’s interest in decreasing underage 
alcohol consumption and Section 5-20-40(B)(3)’s restriction on 
                                                 
106 Swecker, 602 F.3d at 587. 
107 Id.  Both newspapers asked the courts to grant them injunctive relief to enjoin the 
enforcement of the Alcohol Beverage Control Board’s enforcement ability under the 
regulation.  Id. 
108 Id. at 591.  The court overturned the district court’s decision, holding that the 
regulation was a facially unconstitutional ban on commercial speech.  Id. at 587. 
109 Id. at 589.  The court held that, although the law was primarily intended to apply to 
underage students, it did not restrict speech solely to underage students; rather, it 
infringed on the rights of the “of age” students to receive the message, and therefore, 
triggered the Central Hudson test protections.  Id. 
110 Id. 
111 See id. at 590 (“[I]t is illogical to think that alcohol ads do not increase demand.”). 
112 Id. at 589.  The court held that a common sense link between alcohol advertising and 
alcohol consumption could be found because alcoholic beverage companies would not 
advertise in these publications if they did not believe that it would help sell their products.  
Id.  The court stated that, “[i]t is counterintuitive for alcohol vendors to spend their money 
on advertisements in newspapers with relatively limited circulation, directed primarily at 
college students, if they believed that these ads would not increase demand by college 
students.”  Id.  Further, the court noted that the government did not need to produce any 
empirical evidence to satisfy the third prong of the Central Hudson test.  Id.  Moreover, the 
court noted that the college newspapers did nothing to contradict this link or recognize the 
distinction between advertisements in the local newspapers and advertisements in mass 
media publications.  Id. at 590.  On the other hand, the dissent opposed the majority’s 
analysis because “underage . . . drinking by college students has not diminished since the 
enactment of this regulation; rather, the evidence demonstrates that the problem has grown 
and exacerbated over time, despite the decades-old restriction.”  Id. at 593–94 n.5. 
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commercial speech.113  Further, the court held that the ban on alcohol 
advertisements was sufficiently narrow and was a cost-effective 
prevention method.114 
Pitt News and Swecker are clear examples of the varying 
interpretations of the Central Hudson test that have damaged the 
solidarity of the commercial speech doctrine.115  The inconsistent 
application of the Central Hudson test persists today mainly because of 
multiple standards used by the Supreme Court and the divided 
philosophies of the Justices.116 
                                                 
113 Id. at 590. 
114 Id. at 591.  The majority found that the alcohol ban in the newspapers was a 
reasonable fit because it did not affect all possible publications on college campuses due to 
the fact that it only limited the advertisements in publications that targeted students under 
twenty-one years of age.  Id.  However, the dissent recognized that: 
There is no evidence that these newspapers are “targeted at students 
under twenty-one.”  [Rather,] [t]he record reveals that the majority of 
the readership of these newspapers is of legal age to drink.  
Accordingly, under the fourth step of the Central Hudson test, the 
regulation . . . is not “a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired 
objective . . . . ” 
Id. (citing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001)).  Moreover, the court 
conceded that, although the government may have other less restrictive and more effective 
means in fighting underage drinking, this reasonably effective method of combating 
underage drinking was sufficient to meet the reasonable fit standard.  Id. at 591.  
Alternatively, the dissent noted that, while the majority correctly recited that the law 
restricting speech does not have to be the single best method of achieving the government’s 
interest, it failed to realize that “a commercial speech restriction must be a necessary as 
opposed to merely convenient means of achieving the [government’s] interests, and the 
costs and benefits associated with the restriction must be carefully calculated.”  Id. at 595 
(internal quotations omitted).  The dissent observed that there were more direct and less 
restrictive means of decreasing alcohol consumption by minors on college campuses such 
as:  (1) increased taxation on alcohol; (2) counter-advertising to correct perceptions of 
college drinking habits; and (3) publishing editorial pamphlets about alcohol abuse and 
distributing them to college students and their parents.  Id. at 596. 
115 Compare  Swecker, 602 F.3d at 589–90 (using the common sense standard to conclude 
that alcohol advertising bans logically cause a decrease in drinking without any extrinsic 
evidence and holding that the government’s ban on alcohol advertising in collegiate 
newspapers had a reasonable fit with decreasing alcohol demand on college campuses), 
with Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 107 (3d Cir. 2004) (using the material degree 
standard to prohibit the government from banning alcohol advertisements in college 
newspapers because the government had no evidence that eliminating alcoholic beverage 
advertisements in college newspapers would combat underage or abusive drinking and 
holding the fit between banning alcohol advertisements in college newspapers and 
underage drinking was not reasonable). 
116 See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(“[C]ommercial speech that is free from fraud or duress or the advocacy of unlawful 
activity is entitled to only an ‘intermediate standard.’”);  Id. at 778 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting).  O’Connor stated that: 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
Interpreting the Central Hudson test has been a difficult task for the 
Supreme Court.  Presently, the Court permits the use of both the material 
degree standard and the common sense standard to prove that a 
restriction on commercial speech directly advances a government 
interest.117  This bifurcated analysis has created a split in the circuits 
concerning the burden of proof necessary to show materiality.118  
Moreover, the standard that governs Central Hudson’s fourth prong 
remains unsettled due to the fact that the Supreme Court has not decided 
a case on this prong for a decade, and less than a handful of cases have 
applied the reasonable fit standard.119  Likewise, some individual Justices 
on the Court have expressed concern over the legitimacy of the 
commercial speech doctrine as a whole, while others have vehemently 
                                                                                                             
I continue to believe that this Court took a wrong turn with Bates v. 
State Bar of Arizona . . . .  These cases consistently focus on whether the 
challenged advertisement directly harms the listener . . . .  This focus is 
too narrow.  In my view, the [s]tates have the broader authority to 
prohibit commercial speech that, albeit not directly harmful to the 
listener, is inconsistent with the speaker’s membership in a learned 
profession and therefore damaging to the profession and society at 
large. 
Id.; see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“I continue to believe that when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order 
to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in 
question may be characterized as ‘commercial.’”). 
117 Compare Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770–71 (holding that more than mere speculation or 
conjecture must be presented by the government to justify a restriction on commercial 
speech), with Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995) (stating that “history, 
consensus, and ‘simple common sense’” has been sufficient to justify restrictions on speech 
in strict scrutiny cases). 
118 See Hinegardner, supra note 31, at 570 (detailing the various approaches in regard to 
the common sense standard that the lower courts have taken in interpreting the third 
prong of the Central Hudson test). 
119 See Reilly, 533 U.S. at 556 (holding that, in Florida Bar, the Court “made it clear that ‘the 
least restrictive means’ is not the standard; instead, the case law requires a reasonable fit 
between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends, . . . a means 
narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective’” (citations omitted)); Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 
632 (“In Fox, we made clear that the ‘least restrictive means’ test has no role in the 
commercial speech context.”); Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 
(1989) (“Whatever the conflicting tenor of our prior dicta may be, we now focus upon this 
specific issue for the first time, and conclude that the reason of the matter requires 
something short of a least-restrictive means standard.”).  But see 44 Liquormart, Inc., v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996) (suggesting that the least restrictive means test was 
applicable because “[t]he [s]tate also cannot satisfy the requirement that its restriction on 
speech be no more extensive than necessary.  It is perfectly obvious that alternative forms 
of regulation that would not involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to 
achieve the [s]tate’s goal of promoting temperance.”). 
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fought over its governing standards.120  Nevertheless, critics argue that 
commercial speech should be protected to:  (1) safeguard a consumer’s 
right to receive truthful information about commercial products;121 (2) 
limit over- and under-inclusion;122 (3) decrease the government’s 
paternalistic actions;123 and (4) diminish the probability that the 
government will act arbitrarily.124 Undeniably, the uncertainty 
                                                 
120 See Reilly, 533 U.S. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I continue to believe that when the 
government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict 
scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in question may be characterized as 
‘commercial.’”); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Since I do not believe 
we have before us the wherewithal to declare Central Hudson wrong—or at least the 
wherewithal to say what ought to replace it—I must resolve this case in accord with our 
existing jurisprudence . . . .  [Therefore,] I am not disposed to develop new law, or reinforce 
old, on this issue, and accordingly I merely concur in the judgment of the Court.”); Rubin v. 
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497–98 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“In my opinion, 
the Government’s asserted interest, that consumers should be misled or uninformed for 
their own protection, does not suffice to justify restrictions on protected speech in any 
context, whether under ‘exacting scrutiny’ or some other standard.”). 
121 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 
(1976) (“As to the particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of [truthful] commercial 
information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s 
most urgent political debate.”); see also 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 495–96 (“Advertising has 
been a part of our culture throughout our history. . . . In accord with the role that 
commercial messages have long played, the law has developed to ensure that advertising 
provides consumers with accurate information about the availability of goods and 
services.”). 
122 Compare Reilly, 533 U.S. at 585 (holding that a law prohibiting the advertisement of 
tobacco to prevent children from smoking was over-inclusive if it also restricted adult 
access to the information in the advertisement), and BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 
34, at 1213 (defining over-inclusion as legislation that “extend[s] beyond the class of 
persons intended to be protected or regulated” and articulating that over-inclusive laws 
burden more people “than necessary to cure the problem[s]” being targeted), with Linmark 
Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 86, 93 (1977) (holding that a township 
ordinance banning “For Sale” or “Sold” signs was under-inclusive because it only banned 
the use of for sale signs for real estate, but permitted all other for sale signs in other 
contexts), and THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, supra note 99 (defining under-inclusion as 
legislation that prohibits some conduct but fails to prohibit other similar conduct). 
123 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770 (stating that the government had “an 
alternative to this highly paternalistic approach”).  “[T]o assume that this information is not 
in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well 
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of 
communication rather than to close them.”  Id.; see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 
(1993) (stating that “[t]he commercial marketplace . . . provides a forum where ideas and 
information flourish.  Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of slight worth.  
But the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the 
value of the information presented.”). 
124 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 928 (expressing the idea that if government is to 
decide what is true and right and suppress everything else, then government will 
inevitably censor speech to serve its own ends); MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE 
STRATEGY 28–29 (1980) [hereinafter COMPETITIVE STRATEGY] (arguing that the government 
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surrounding the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test have 
hampered the growth of the commercial speech doctrine and have 
created irreconcilable differences between holdings in different 
jurisdictions.125 
Part III.A of this Note will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of 
the differing standards given by the Supreme Court regarding the third 
prong of the Central Hudson test.126  Specifically, Part III.A.1 will discuss 
the material degree standard and Part III.A.2 will discuss the common 
sense standard.127  Then, Part III.B will examine the strengths and 
weaknesses of the differing standards handed down by the Court 
concerning the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.128  In particular, 
Part III.B.1 will evaluate the least restrictive means test and Part III.B.2 
will assess the reasonable fit test.129  Lastly, Part III.C will evaluate the 
implications of this issue if it is not resolved.130 
A. Different Standards for Central Hudson’s Third Prong 
Central Hudson held that the restriction on speech must directly 
advance the government’s substantial interest.131  Over time, the Court 
encountered cases that forced it to discern how much and what kinds of 
evidence are needed to prove direct advancement.132  Presently, there are 
                                                                                                             
is ill-equipped to advance or bar certain products or brands from the marketplace because 
in so doing, it sets structural conditions that limit the behavior of firms, it affects the 
position of an industry with regulations, subsidies, and other means, and it increases the 
relative cost of doing business).  Further, the government may ban products due to political 
factors or pressure, rather than rational economic concerns.  Id. 
125 See supra Part II.B (discussing the various cases that utilize different approaches for 
the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test). 
126 See infra Part III.A (distinguishing the different standards mentioned by the Court 
concerning the third prong of the Central Hudson test). 
127 See infra Part III.A.1 and Part III.A.2 (explaining the diverse evidentiary thresholds of 
the material degree and common sense standards). 
128 See infra Part III.B (discussing the conflicting standards applied by the Court regarding 
the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test). 
129 See infra Part III.B.1 and Part III.B.2 (exploring the repercussions resulting from an 
application of the least restrictive means and reasonable fit standards to the fourth prong of 
the Central Hudson test). 
130 See infra Part III.C (pinpointing the long-term consequences of ignoring the different 
standards set forth in the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test). 
131 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
132 See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993) (finding that the state presented “no 
studies that suggest personal solicitation of prospective business clients by CPA’s creates 
the dangers of fraud, overreaching, or compromised independence that the Board claims to 
fear” and that the government did “not disclose any anecdotal evidence, either from 
Florida or another [s]tate, that validates the Board’s suppositions”); Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985) (stating that, 
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two radically different standards—the material degree standard and the 
common sense standard—that courts can follow to satisfy this element of 
the Central Hudson test.133  The two sections below will outline the 
positive and negative aspects of each standard and explain how they 
differ. 
1. The Material Degree Standard 
The Supreme Court has appointed the third prong the vanguard of 
the Central Hudson test.134  The material degree standard states that the 
government can comply with the third prong of the Central Hudson test 
only if it proves, through minimal empirical or anecdotal evidence, that a 
restriction on speech directly furthers its interest.135  This safeguard 
protects First Amendment rights from being violated by speculative 
                                                                                                             
“nowhere does the [s]tate cite any evidence or authority of any kind for its contention that 
the potential abuses associated with the use of illustrations in attorneys’ advertising cannot 
be combated by any means short of a blanket ban”); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 
463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983) (holding that a law that criminalized sending information about 
contraceptive through the mail was unconstitutional under the third prong of the Central 
Hudson test because it “provide[d] only the most limited incremental support for the 
interest asserted”); In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 205–06 (1982) (concluding that it was 
unconstitutional for a state to reprimand an attorney for placing an advertisement in a 
newspaper when “[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate that the inclusion of this 
information was misleading”). 
133 See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770–71 (holding that the government must present some 
evidence that its ban on commercial speech will reduce the harm done and that mere 
speculation or conjecture will not suffice to meet this standard).  But see Fla. Bar v. Went for 
It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995) (holding that case law does not “require that empirical data 
come to us accompanied by a surfeit of background information [and] . . . speech 
restrictions [may be justified] by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different 
locales altogether, or even, . . . based solely on history, consensus, and ‘simple common sense’” 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added)). 
134 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co, 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995).  Justice Thomas writing for the 
majority stated: 
[A] governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial 
speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its 
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.  We 
cautioned that this requirement was critical; otherwise, a [s]tate could 
with ease restrict commercial speech in the service of other objectives 
that could not themselves justify a burden on commercial expression. 
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
135 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (“‘[T]he speech restriction 
[must] directly and materially advanc[e] the asserted governmental interest.’”).  However, 
the Court does not “require that ‘empirical data come . . . accompanied by a surfeit of 
background information . . . .  [W]e have permitted litigants to justify speech restrictions by 
reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether.’” Id. 
(alterations in original). 
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harms alleged by the government.136  Thus, by requiring a scintilla of 
empirical or even anecdotal evidence, the government is prevented from 
acting as a paternalistic force.137 
Furthermore, if empirical evidence is necessary to prove a 
correlation between commercial advertising and societal harm, then the 
interference with citizens’ autonomy is less severe.138  As a consequence, 
the government is required to prove objectively that a restriction on 
speech will actually mitigate its cited harm.139  Therefore, before a 
commercial message is arbitrarily taken off of the shelves of the 
intellectual marketplace, depriving consumers of their constitutional 
right to receive the message, the government will have to justify the 
suppression of speech by pointing to empirical facts supporting its 
action.  The material degree standard can help prevent the government 
from subjectively deciding what advertising is too harmful to hear or 
what products are too dangerous to promote.140 
Despite the apparently straightforward nature of the material degree 
standard, the Court has convoluted the principle, and in so doing, 
diluted its strength.141  In Edenfield, the Court held that the government 
cannot “‘directly advance’” its interests through “mere speculation [and] 
                                                 
136 See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770 (holding that the government could not directly advance 
its cited interest through “mere speculation or conjecture”). 
137 See Hinegardner, supra note 31, at 557 (proposing “a significant, verifiable, and 
reasonable quantum of evidence” standard to satisfy the third prong of the Central Hudson 
test, which would, in effect, reject the common sense standard). 
138 See infra text accompanying note 141 (noting that the material degree standard can 
help prevent the government from determining what advertising is too harmful or what 
products are too dangerous to endorse). 
139 Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism:  Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional 
Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115, 169 (2003).  Zick states: 
[L]egislative predictions, legislative theories and causal claims have 
also come under heightened empirical examination.  Theories like 
market diminution, which have been accepted without empirical 
support in the past, have been treated as implausible, judicially tested, 
and found wanting.  Causal claims which would be difficult, at best, to 
empirically demonstrate have been rejected for lack of empirical 
support.  The clear trend is to treat legislative predicates as empirically 
falsifiable propositions. 
Id. 
140 See, e.g., Edenfield, 507 U.S. at  771 (holding that the government failed to meet the 
third prong of the Central Hudson test when it banned certified public accountants from 
soliciting new clients in-person as the government had no factual basis for believing that 
this practice would further fraud). 
141 See Hinegardner, supra note 31, at 570 (arguing that a material evidence test would 
“prevent dilution of Central Hudson [and] intermediate scrutiny to an unlawful, de facto 
rational basis level by providing the Court with an ample amount of evidence for it to 
make an informed decision”). 
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conjecture.”142  This implies that the government must present some hard 
evidence to restrict commercial speech.  Yet, this is not the approach that 
the Supreme Court has taken.143  In fact, the Court has expressed that it 
will uphold a law restricting commercial speech without the production 
of any empirical evidence whatsoever.144  Therefore, this paradoxical 
standard leaves practitioners with little guidance and lower courts 
bewildered about what evidence is necessary to sustain a restriction on 
commercial speech.145 
2. The Common Sense Standard 
The Supreme Court has never expressly accepted the common sense 
standard as a means to satisfy the third prong of the Central Hudson 
test.146  Nevertheless, this standard has been utilized by the First, Second, 
                                                 
142 Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770.  The Court stated, “[t]his burden is not satisfied by mere 
speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on 
commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its 
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”  Id. at 770–71. 
143 Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995).  The Court stated: 
In any event, we do not read our case law to require that empirical 
data come to us accompanied by a surfeit of background information.  
Indeed, in other First Amendment contexts, we have permitted 
litigants to justify speech restrictions by reference to studies and 
anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether, or even, in a case 
applying strict scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on history, 
consensus, and “simple common sense.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
144 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (“We do not, however, 
require that ‘empirical data come . . . accompanied by . . . background information.’” (first 
alteration in original)); see also Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 628 (holding that there does not need to 
be a showing of any empirical evidence to sustain a ban on commercial speech because 
“[n]othing in Edenfield, a case in which the [s]tate offered no evidence or anecdotes in 
support of its restriction, requires more”). 
145 Compare Pagan v. Fruchey, 492 F.3d 766, 777 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that a city had to 
produce sufficient empirical evidence showing that private commercial signs on streets 
were a threat to motorists because “the intermediate scrutiny we apply in the commercial 
speech context charges the government with the burden of justifying its chosen form of 
regulation.  Thus, even common sense decisions require some justification.”), with G.K. Ltd. 
Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that legislative 
deliberation, a dynamic dialogue with the city’s residents and businesses, extensive 
hearings, and a city council’s reliance on the experience of other cities was sufficient 
evidence to institute a commercial sign restriction on city roads). 
146 Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 148 
(1994).  The Court suggested that the government must present some evidence of the causal 
link between the government’s substantial interest and advertising when it stated, “[w]e 
have never sustained restrictions on constitutionally protected speech based on a record so 
bare as the one on which the [b]oard relies here.”  Id.  Arguably, the Court molded this new 
interpretation of Central Hudson’s third prong from two sources.  The most evident source, 
which is cited in Florida Bar, is from Justice Blackmun’s plurality opinion in Burson v. 
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Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts in 
deciding commercial speech cases.147  Moreover, the common sense 
standard can be justified on the grounds that progressive policy 
implications result from its application.148 
A principal benefit derived from the common sense standard is that 
a presumption is created in favor of the government.  It is assumed that, 
if there is a correlation between advertising and demand for a particular 
product, a statute or regulation directly advances the government’s 
interest in restricting commercial speech.149  Legislators may utilize this 
efficient and powerful tool when attacking advertisements that promote 
                                                                                                             
Freeman.  Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 628.  In that case, the Court upheld a restriction on solicitors 
distributing campaign materials to voters within 100 feet of a polling station’s entrance.  
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992).  The Court recognized both the First 
Amendment right to free speech and the right to cast a ballot in an election free from the 
taint of intimidation and fraud.  Id. at 206–07.  After applying strict scrutiny, the Court held 
that “[a] long history, a substantial consensus, and simple common sense show that some 
restricted zone around polling places is necessary . . . .  Given the conflict between these 
two rights, we hold that requiring solicitors to stand 100 feet from the entrances to polling 
places does not constitute an unconstitutional compromise.”  Id. at 211.  Second, in Central 
Hudson, the Court more subtly noted that “our decisions have recognized ‘the 
“commonsense” distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction . . . and 
other varieties of speech.’”  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 
447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980). 
147 See Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 589–90 (4th Cir. 2010) (using the 
common sense standard to uphold a ban on alcohol advertising in college newspapers); 
Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 92–96 (2d Cir. 2010) (using the common sense standard to 
strike down a law banning attorney advertising); WV Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal 
Servs. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 303–05 (4th Cir. 2009) (applying the common sense 
standard to uphold a state ban on using a state’s video lottery system to advertise); IMS 
Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 59 (1st Cir. 2008) (using the common sense standard to 
allow the legislature to assume “that net medical outlays will decrease as a result of the 
withdrawal of prescribing histories from detailers”); Pagan v. Fruchey, 492 F.3d 766, 777, 
779 (6th Cir. 2007) (using the common sense standard to aid in reversing a district court’s 
judgment that upheld a ban on parking automobiles with “For Sale” signs on public 
streets); G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(concluding that the common sense standard permits a ban on street signs to further the 
city’s interest in improving traffic safety); Pac. Frontier v. Pleasant Grove City, 414 F.3d 
1221, 1235 (10th Cir. 2005) (supporting using the common sense standard to invalidate a 
city’s ordinance establishing a solicitor’s licensing procedure); Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Am. 
Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 655, 658 (8th Cir. 2003) (using the common sense standard to 
approve a ban on unsolicited faxes containing advertisements because these faxes shifted 
the costs of advertising from the sender to the recipient); Mason v. Fla. Bar, 208 F.3d 952, 
957–58 (11th Cir. 2000) (using the common sense standard to aid in invalidating a state bar 
rule prohibiting self-laudatory advertisements by lawyers). 
148 See infra notes 150–60 (discussing the policy implications of applying the common 
sense standard). 
149 See Swecker, 602 F.3d at 589–90 (holding that the common sense standard is met if the 
government demonstrates a strong link between advertising bans and decreases in the 
consumption of harmful products). 
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harmful products.150  In effect, this standard provides a weapon to 
preemptively strike commercial advertising that encourages unhealthy 
behavior in society.151  Also, under the common sense standard, 
government entities are not required to scour studies or collect data to 
prove the obvious problems linked to a particular strain of commercial 
speech.152 
In some circumstances, there is limited or incomplete evidence to 
support the government’s assertion that the commercial speech is 
producing a precise harm.153  If only inadequate or underdeveloped 
studies exist on the particular subject, then many municipalities and 
state governments may be forced to abandon cases against harmful 
commercial speech.154  This is likely due to the lack of adequate funding 
or resources needed to complete the empirical studies and reports 
required to prove the detrimental effects of the alleged commercial 
harm.155  Alternatively, in many cases, the government cannot draw 
                                                 
150 Id. 
151 See id. at 590 (holding that it is self-evident that alcohol vendors spend money on 
advertisements in college newspapers because they believe these advertisements will 
increase revenues and gross sales of their products). 
152 See, e.g., Zick, supra note 60, at 132.  Zick states: 
[L]egal empiricists and their counterparts in other disciplines collected 
heaps of data, but they had difficulty drawing conclusions from their 
observations, which often pointed in several directions at once.  With 
indeterminate data, the empiricists failed to advance either the rule-
determination or predictive realist agendas.  Essentially, empirical 
stalemates left them with nowhere to go. 
Id. 
153 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1813 (2009) (“There are some 
propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be marshaled” and that “[i]t is one 
thing to set aside agency action . . . because of failure to adduce empirical data that can 
readily be obtained.  It is something else to insist upon obtaining the 
unobtainable.”(citation omitted)); see also Calvert & Bunker, supra note 57, at 773 
(suggesting that empirical data must only play a limited part in determining the causation 
element of a commercial speech case because empirical evidence can be too much of a good 
thing if the persistence in pursuing it causes courts to overlook obvious moral and social 
consequences of allowing certain commercial speech). 
154 See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993) (holding that a state statute 
prohibiting certified public accountants from conducting in-person solicitations to potential 
clients was unconstitutional because the state had failed to present studies or anecdotal 
accounts that certified public accountants were perpetuating fraud; thus, the state could 
not continue its attack on this perceived danger); Zick, supra note 60, at 149–51 (comparing 
and contrasting the Edenfield and Florida Bar cases to suggest that, under the current 
Supreme Court interpretation, states cannot passively enact statutes limiting commercial 
speech).  Rather, states must get their hands dirty and find ways to collect empirical 
evidence to support these restrictions or these laws will be declared void by the courts).  Id. 
at 149–51. 
155 See Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1813 (stating that “[o]ne cannot [always] 
demand a multiyear controlled study” to prove a purported harm). 
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concrete conclusions from the evidence presented because social 
scientists have collected such enormous sets of data, which offer several 
different rational explanations of how the cited harm has been created.156  
The common sense standard eliminates roadblocks such as the 
administrative burden of creating volumes of reliable data and sifting 
through conflicting reports, and therefore helps courts to reach a 
decision on whether the advertising is linked to a societal harm.157 
Some advertisements do not give much, if any, helpful or reliable 
information to consumers about the company’s products.158  The central 
premise of the commercial speech doctrine is that it grants consumers 
the ability to gather the truthful information they need to make critical 
daily economic decisions.159  Therefore, the undemanding nature of the 
common sense standard aids the government in regulating harmful 
advertisements by filtering out messages that have lost their 
informational value, only allowing truthful advertising to reach 
consumers. 
Despite the benefits of adopting the common sense standard, lower 
courts have not been able to come to a consensus over its interpretation 
ever since the Court hinted at its viability.160  While many circuits 
recognize the common sense standard, no two courts precisely agree on 
                                                 
156 See Zick, supra note 60, at 132 (arguing that social science stalemates produce poor 
scientifically predictive observations that hinder reliable judicial outcomes and hamper 
social value judgment). 
157 See id. at 128–30 (stating that some legal formalism scholars believe that courts should 
decide the constitutionality of rights and powers through concepts and hypothetical 
examples, rather than through overwhelming, mundane, and sometimes contradictory 
data). 
158 See Shimp & Preston, supra note 2, at 22–23, 30 (concluding that more advertisers are 
relying on deceptive, evaluative advertising that uses puffery and ambiguous terms to lure 
in consumers, rather than factual advertising that can be objectively analyzed in the 
product by looking at the inherent qualities of the product, because the Federal Trade 
Commission has discouraged advertisers from using factual claims and evaluative 
marketing protects brand name products). 
159 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 
(1976). 
160 See Hinegardner, supra note 31, at 548–52 (explaining that there are four classifications 
of appellate court interpretations regarding the common sense standard).  The four 
classifications are:  (1) the strong view, which holds that the court can utilize its common 
sense in adjudicating commercial speech cases, but it must couple this with some empirical 
evidence to support the existence of a public harm; (2) the legislative deference view, which 
holds that the First Amendment requires states to assess their own interests realistically 
and to take only reasonable steps in furtherance of these discerned interests; (3) the logical 
nexus view, which holds that there is a legislative presumption that advertising increases 
consumption; and (4) the irrationality view, which states that statutes riddled with 
exceptions cannot directly and materially advance its purpose when other provisions of the 
statute directly undermine or counteract the state’s interest.  Id. 
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how it is to be implemented.161  Additionally, confusion among lower 
courts has produced an unclear definition of common sense.162  In some 
cases, the government meets the third prong’s scrutiny merely by 
alleging a specific harm and rationally tying it to commercial 
advertising.163  In other jurisdictions, the connection between an 
                                                 
161 See Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 589–90 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(using the logical nexus approach to the common sense standard to conclude that alcohol 
advertising causes an increase in binge drinking); Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 92–96 
(2d Cir. 2010) (advocating for the strong view of the common sense standard); WV Ass’n of 
Club Owners & Fraternal Servs. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 303 (4th Cir. 2009) (applying the 
logical nexus approach to the commonsense standard to hold that video advertising at 
casinos may cause gambling addicts to compulsively spend money); IMS Health Inc. v. 
Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 58–59 (1st Cir. 2008) (adopting the legislative deference view to the 
simple common sense standard); Pagan v. Fruchey, 492 F.3d 766, 782 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(Rogers, J., dissenting) (holding that  the strong view is the appropriate common sense 
standard because “[i]t simply does not follow from Edenfield that [the government] is not 
free, without evidence or studies, to make a common sense determination that allowing 
business to be conducted in the street presents certain hazards”); G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of 
Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006) (adopting the legislative deference 
standard to hold that legislative deliberation, a dynamic dialogue with the city’s residents 
and businesses, extensive hearings, and a City Council’s reliance on the experience of other 
cities was sufficient evidence to institute a commercial sign restriction on certain sizes, 
types, and designs of advertisements on city roads); Pac. Frontier v. Pleasant Grove City, 
414 F.3d 1221, 1235 (10th Cir. 2005) (supporting the strong view approach in applying the 
common sense standard to invalidate a city’s ordinance establishing a solicitor’s licensing 
procedure because it violated the plaintiff’s First Amendment commercial speech rights); 
Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 654–55 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that the legislative deference standard was the correct interpretation of the common sense 
standard and proving that legislative findings showed that prohibitions on unsolicited 
commercial fax advertisements directly and materially advanced the government’s 
asserted interest); Mason v. Fla. Bar, 208 F.3d 952, 957 (11th Cir. 2000) (expressing that the 
strong view approach to the common sense standard was correct and that “the Supreme 
Court has not accepted ‘common sense’ alone to prove the existence of a concrete, non-
speculative harm”). 
162 Compare Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 107 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that no state 
official had provided evidence that the elimination of alcohol advertisements in Pitt News 
had “ma[d]e it harder for would-be purchasers to locate places near campus where 
alcoholic beverages may be purchased” and “[c]ommon sense suggests that would-be 
drinkers [would] have no difficulty finding those establishments despite” the law banning 
these advertisements), with Swecker, 602 F.3d at 589 (“[C]ommon sense support[s] the link 
between advertising bans in college newspapers and a decrease in demand for alcohol 
among college students.”). 
163 See Swecker, 602 F.3d at 590 (holding that an advertising ban on alcohol in college 
newspapers passed the Central Hudson test because alcohol vendors would not advertise in 
these publications unless they believed that it would increase consumption of their product 
by underage college students); Musgrave, 553 F.3d at 305 (concluding that restrictions on 
advertising on a state’s video lottery system avoided failing the third prong of the Central 
Hudson test because there was a rational link between reducing the demand for the lottery 
as well as the spread of private lotteries and restricting video advertising); Ayotte, 550 F.3d 
at 59 (finding that a state legislature could reasonably assume that “net medical outlays 
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advertisement and the government’s cited harm, however logical it may 
be, has resulted in a dismissal of the case when it is not coupled with any 
supporting empirical data.164 
Moreover, the common sense standard is naturally paternalistic.165  
In upholding government-sanctioned restrictions on commercial speech, 
courts permit the government to establish what it thinks to be in the best 
interests of its citizens.166  Consequently, citizens are limited in their 
ability to make independent decisions about commercial products.  
Furthermore, this method of government action effectively operates as a 
prior restraint on free speech because it prohibits certain advertisements 
from ever being disseminated, regardless of the balanced content 
included in the advertisement.167  Messages can be pulled from the 
media before ever appearing in a newspaper or over the airwaves.  This 
is an extreme measure; an alternative is to punish advertisers after 
                                                                                                             
will decrease as a result of the withdrawal of prescribing histories from detailers”); G.K. 
Ltd. Travel, 436 F.3d at 1073 (concluding that legislative dialogue and citizens’ 
communication with elected officials was enough to justify a link between restricting street 
signs and improving traffic safety); Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d at 655, 658 (holding that a 
state legislature could find a common sense link between unsolicited faxes containing 
advertisements and preventing senders from shifting the cost of advertising to recipients). 
164 See Alexander, 598 F.3d at 92 (holding that a thirty-day moratorium for targeted 
solicitation following a specific incident, including targeted ads on television or in other 
media, was unconstitutional because the government did not produce any evidence that 
there were any consumer complaints or academic studies showing that attorney 
advertising tarnished the profession’s integrity); Pagan, 492 F.3d at 777–78 (holding that a 
city ordinance banning street signs could not be upheld because the city failed to provide 
any evidence that the signs created an increase in traffic risks); Pac. Frontier, 414 F.3d at 
1236 (finding that a city’s ban on solicitation without submitting a fingerprint sample and 
posting a bond was unconstitutional because the city did not present any evidence that 
these procedures would decrease damage done to private property by solicitors). 
165 See Hinegardner, supra note 31, at 556–57 (suggesting that a challenger in a common 
sense standard case could easily make an argument that a law is paternalistic because the 
state in these cases does not have to produce any evidence before the court).  Alternatively, 
by making the government put forth evidence that “a proscriptive measure” is necessary, 
the legislature has proof that its actions were legitimate.  Id. at 556–57. 
166 See id. at 554 (“Paternalism triggers hefty First Amendment consequences when 
governments proceed under its auspices; the ‘government’s power ebbs when it tells us 
what to say or hear for own good [sic].’”). 
167 See Post, supra note 23, at 583 (arguing that past court decisions have encouraged 
states to regulate commercial speech by using prior restraints because of “the assumption 
that the constitutional value of commercial speech lies in the circulation of information 
rather than in the independent interests of commercial speakers”); see also Cent. Hudson 
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980) (stating in 
dicta that prior restraints on commercial speech may be permissible because the expression 
of self-interested marketers should be subject to extensive regulation and advertisers are in 
the best position to evaluate the accuracy of their statements). 
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publishing false or misleading assertions.168  If this occurs, then honest 
marketers are prevented from making truthful information available to 
consumers.  Further, public advertisements may be the only warning 
about specific products or services that reach consumers, even if this 
message is found in a small disclaimer or written in fine print.169 
The common sense approach allows the government to zealously 
protect its citizens against misleading or false advertisements that 
threaten unsuspecting consumers.170  However, this presumes that 
consumers are incapable of making informed decisions for themselves 
and are unable to see through the veil of vague, yet captivating, 
commercial advertisements.171  Further, it assumes that the government 
has a foolproof method to protect its constituents—with or without 
supporting empirical data.  Like the third prong of the Central Hudson 
test, the fourth prong has been clouded by multiple standards and 
different interpretations that have shifted throughout its existence. 
                                                 
168 See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554, 559–60 (1976) (stating that 
professional discipline, defamation, and other civil sanctions should be instituted as 
alternatives to prior restraints due to the fact that the postponement or concealment of 
speech may totally prevent important ideas from ever reaching the public). 
169 See Richard J. Barber, Government and the Consumer, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (1966) 
(arguing that the government has monopolistically sided with producers in promoting a 
free enterprise economy and has limited information for consumers).  But see About Us, 
PARTNERSHIP DRUGFREE.ORG, http://www.drugfree.org/about (last visited Nov. 10, 2010) 
(implementing a national campaign aimed at translating current research on teen behavior, 
publicizing information about addiction and treatment, and suggesting resources for 
parents and drug users); FAQ’s, TRUTH, http://www.thetruth.com/faq  (last visited Oct. 
21, 2010) (disseminating facts to the public on behalf of the American Legacy Foundation 
about the harmful effects of tobacco products and the manipulative strategies tobacco 
companies use to advertise their products); Get the Facts, ABOVETHEINLUENCE.COM, 
http://www.abovetheinfluence.com/facts/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2010) (publicizing the 
dangers of prescription drugs, alcohol, marijuana, methamphetamines, inhalants, and 
ecstasy to the public on behalf of the Office of National Drug Control Policy). 
170 See supra Part III.A.2 (noting that the common sense standard allows the government 
to protect citizens from alleged commercial harms by banning advertising when there is 
little evidence to support these claims or to show that the costs of obtaining such 
information would be burdensome). 
171 See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002) (“[We reject] the notion 
that the Government has an interest in preventing the dissemination of truthful commercial 
information in order to prevent members of the public from making bad decisions with the 
information.”); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (“[B]ans against 
truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech . . . usually rest solely on the offensive 
assumption that the public will respond ‘irrationally’ to the truth.  [Yet,] [t]he First 
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in 
the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.”(citation omitted)). 
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B. Different Standards for Central Hudson’s Fourth Prong 
Although the Court may have unintentionally created ambiguity in 
the analysis of the third prong of the Central Hudson test, it is undisputed 
that a fierce battle exists over the precise standard that should govern the 
fourth prong.172  Since the birth of the test, the Court has debated 
whether the least restrictive means standard should be applied.173  
Alternatively, many Justices strongly believe that the reasonable fit 
standard should be implemented.174  Currently, the reasonable fit 
standard is being used by the Court, and according to this standard, the 
government must demonstrate the narrow tailoring of a challenged 
regulation to its asserted interest—a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but 
reasonable—that represents not necessarily the single best disposition 
but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.175  
Nevertheless, due to the back-and-forth history of this prong, the 
legitimacy of the reasonable fit standard remains questionable.176  The 
                                                 
172 Compare 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 524 n.6 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
Court has held, in decisions such as Discovery Network, that “commercial speech restrictions 
[are] impermissible if alternatives are ‘numerous’ and obvious”), with id. at 529 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (arguing that the proper inquiry about the fourth prong of the Central 
Hudson test concerns the fit between the government’s goal and the legislature’s method 
“that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single 
best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served”). 
173 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980) (holding that a restriction on commercial speech could not be more extensive than 
necessary to serve the government’s substantial interests); see also 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 
507 (“[A]lternative forms of regulation that would not involve any restriction on speech 
would be more likely to achieve the [s]tate’s goal of promoting temperance.”); Rubin v. 
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995) (“The FAAA’s defects are further highlighted 
by the availability of alternatives that would prove less intrusive to the First Amendment’s 
protections for commercial speech.”). 
174 See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999).  The 
Court held that: 
Government is not required to employ the least restrictive means 
conceivable, but it must demonstrate narrow tailoring of the 
challenged regulation to the asserted interest—“a fit that is not 
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the 
single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the 
interest served.” 
Id.  The Court has also expressed that “our [past] decisions upholding the regulation of 
commercial speech cannot be reconciled with a requirement of least restrictive means.”  Bd. 
of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 479 (1989). 
175 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 527 U.S. at 188. 
176 Compare id. at 188–89 (reaffirming the reasonable fit standard), and Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 
(stating that narrowly tailored in the commercial speech context means that there “is a 
‘“fit” between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends’—a fit 
that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best 
disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest served’”(citation omitted)), 
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two sections below analyze the pros and cons of implementing each 
standard. 
1. The Least Restrictive Means Test 
In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Court found that the government 
must show that the restriction on commercial speech is “no more 
extensive than necessary to serve” the government’s substantial 
interest.177  To meet this standard, the government is required to prove 
that its goal is narrowly tailored so that there is no less speech restrictive 
alternative available.178  Therefore, the “no more extensive than 
necessary” standard exponentially increases the burden of proof that the 
government must carry to constitutionally restrict commercial speech.  
This approach also pushes the Court’s standard of review towards strict 
scrutiny.179 
The least restrictive means test is attractive for a number of reasons.  
First, it creates a bright-line rule in the blurry area of law pertaining to 
commercial speech.180  If a court finds that there is a more moderate 
approach to containing a societal harm than completely banning a 
particular product’s advertisements, the challenger easily wins the 
case.181  Moreover, if a speech restrictive law does pass this lofty 
standard, the elimination of that message is truly necessary to protect the 
                                                                                                             
with 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507 (“It is perfectly obvious that alternative forms of 
regulation that would not involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to 
achieve the [s]tate’s goal of promoting temperance.”), and Rubin, 514 U.S. at 491 (affirming 
that if “alternatives that would prove less intrusive to the First Amendment’s protections” 
exist, then a law restricting commercial speech must be declared unconstitutional). 
177  514 U.S. at 486. 
178 See id. at 491 (“[T]he availability of [alternative] options, all of which could advance 
the Government’s asserted interest in a manner less intrusive to respondent’s First 
Amendment rights, indicates that [a law] is more extensive than necessary.”). 
179 See, e.g., Fallon, Jr., supra note 13, at 1326 (stating that the narrow tailoring requirement 
used in Supreme Court strict scrutiny cases is synonymous with the least restrictive 
alternative standard). 
180 See Howell, supra note 64, at 1094 (stating that “[t]he Court purports to apply a 
standard that lies somewhere between a ‘rational basis’ test and a ‘least restrictive means’ 
test,” and arguing that the Court has left practitioners confused because they have avoided 
drawing a bright line rule); see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 
410, 419 (1993) (rejecting the least restrictive means test as the standard for the fourth prong 
of the Central Hudson test and refusing to draw “bright lines that will clearly cabin 
commercial speech in a distinct category”). 
181 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 524 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that if there are 
obvious alternatives to restricting commercial advertising, such as rationing, taxing, or 
controlling the price of products, then a ban on commercial speech ought to fail.). 
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well-being of consumers.182  Second, the least restrictive means test can 
stifle the harmful effects of over-inclusive commercial speech laws.183  
Under the heavy burden of proof associated with the least restrictive 
means test, the government’s attempts to paternalistically suppress 
speech can be thwarted.184  Therefore, the least restrictive means test 
prohibits the government from drafting overreaching laws that could 
potentially ban truthful commercial content.185  Third, by requiring the 
government to use the least restrictive method on speech to achieve its 
goal, the government is more apt to combat harmful conduct, rather than 
mute truthful speech.186  Alternatives such as increased taxation and 
removal of the harmful products from the marketplace pose less of a 
burden on the First Amendment and more logically achieve the goal of 
eliminating harm.187  Therefore, by using the least restrictive means 
standard, the government is still able to achieve its desired result and 
avoid entangling itself in the First Amendment’s net. 
                                                 
182 See id. at 523–26 (stating that if all other methods have failed to protect consumers 
from harmful products, then a ban on advertising should be permitted; however, this 
ought to be a tool that is used as a last resort). 
183 See Fallon, Jr., supra note 13, at 1328 (stating that it is uncertain exactly how the least 
restrictive means and over-inclusiveness relate to one another, but it can be said that strict 
scrutiny will be satisfied and the least restrictive means test will be met “as long as no 
narrower regulation would suffice, [and] the prohibition against over-inclusiveness 
suggests that a statute might be condemned for lack of narrow tailoring even if no less 
restrictive alternative existed”); Volokh, supra note 65, at 1136 (stating that it is unclear 
whether a least restrictive means test will meet strict scrutiny, even if the regulation is over-
inclusive). 
184 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 578 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(stating that “the sweeping overinclusivity of the regulations” is impermissible if the state 
“has done nothing to target its prohibition to advertisements appealing to ‘excitement, 
glamour, and independence’; the ban applies with equal force to appeals to torpor, 
homeliness, and servility”). 
185 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 510 (using the least restrictive means test to 
“conclude that a state legislature does not have the broad discretion to suppress truthful, 
nonmisleading information for [the] paternalistic purposes” of creating temperance 
throughout its population). 
186 See id. at 502–03 (expressing that a state’s interest in protecting consumers from 
“‘commercial harm[]’” is the reason why commercial speech is subject to intermediate 
scrutiny; however, “bans that target truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages rarely 
protect consumers from such harms.  Instead, such bans often serve only to obscure an 
‘underlying governmental policy’ that could be implemented without regulating 
speech”(footnote omitted)). 
187 See id. at 507 (“[A]lternative forms of regulation that [do] not involve any restriction 
on speech would be more likely to achieve the [s]tate’s goal . . . .  As the [s]tate’s own 
expert conceded, higher prices can be maintained either by direct regulation or by 
increased taxation.”); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 498 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (“Congress may limit directly the alcoholic content of malt beverages.  But 
Congress may not seek to accomplish the same purpose through a policy of consumer 
ignorance, at the expense of the free speech rights of the sellers and purchasers.”). 
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Nonetheless, the least restrictive means standard severely impairs 
the government’s ability to regulate commercial harms.188  Under that 
approach, the government may find it extremely difficult to withstand 
First Amendment scrutiny if there is a plausible alternative to restricting 
commercial speech.189  For example, the government might believe that 
imposing a tax on a particular product will achieve the same change in 
consumer behavior as would a restriction on advertising.190  However, 
the government could be forced to ignore the harmful effects of a 
product if it does not want to take the drastic measure of taxing an entire 
population for the item.191 
Therefore, the least restrictive means standard hinders the 
government’s ability to attack societal problems from multiple vantage 
points.192  Additionally, it forces legislators into a Catch-22, compelling 
them to make a choice between eliminating products from the 
marketplace altogether, increasing the tax on those allegedly harmful 
items, or ignoring the potential harm being done to society.  At its most 
extreme, the ban it-, tax it-, or forget about it-rationale may coerce 
legislators into commiting political suicide by requiring them to either 
choose between banning a popular commercial product—such as 
                                                 
188 See generally Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481 (1989) 
(stating that the Court will “take account of the difficulty of establishing with precision the 
point at which restrictions become more extensive than their objective requires, and 
provide the [l]egislative and [e]xecutive [b]ranches needed leeway in a field (commercial 
speech) ‘traditionally subject to governmental regulation’”). 
189 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993) (“A 
regulation need not be ‘absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired end,’ but if 
there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on 
commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the 
‘fit’ between ends and means is reasonable.”(citation omitted)); Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (stating 
that “the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on 
would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing . . . the harmless from the harmful,” but the 
Court will not “impose upon [the government] the burden of demonstrating that the 
[differentiation] is 100% complete, or that the manner of restriction is absolutely the least 
severe that will achieve the desired end”; rather, the Court will give deference to 
“governmental decisionmakers to judge what manner of regulation may best be 
employed” (internal quotations omitted)). 
190 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 509 (recognizing that the Rhode Island legislature 
decided that a ban on price advertising of alcohol would achieve the same result in 
promoting temperance as an increase in taxes). 
191 See, e.g., id. at 504–07 (holding that Rhode Island unconstitutionally banned price 
advertising of alcohol because the less speech restrictive alternative of increasing taxes on it 
existed and that, through taxes, the state could promote temperance). 
192 See, e.g., id. at 530 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the government’s ban on 
advertising ought to fail if alternatives controlling consumer behavior, such as 
administering taxes, limiting per capita purchases, conducting educational campaigns, or 
prohibiting the sale of the product feasibly exist, even if these measures would not produce 
exactly the same results). 
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cigarettes or alcohol—or remaining passive in the face of a serious 
danger that the product poses society—either way angering one or more 
groups of people.193 
2. The Reasonable Fit Standard 
The current standard adopted by the Court concerning Central 
Hudson’s fourth prong is the reasonable fit standard.194  Under this 
standard, the government is given deference in determining how to meet 
its objectives.195  Specifically, the government can impose restrictions on 
commercial speech if the costs and benefits of the burden on speech are 
“carefully calculated.”196 
The reasonable fit standard gives the government an enhanced 
ability to stop commercial harms.197  The government can obstruct efforts 
to market harmful products without making these items illegal.198  
Therefore, with multiple methods available to tackle the societal 
problems caused by advertising dangerous products, the government is 
not forced into an all-or-nothing ultimatum.199 
Further, this standard limits over-inclusion by not requiring the 
government to impose a total ban on select commercial products to all 
                                                 
193 See infra text accompanying notes 201–03 (explaining that bans on advertising are an 
alternative that legislators would rationally use to limit the negative effects of harmful 
products on the public). 
194 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (finding that there must be 
a “fit” between a commercial speech restriction’s ends and means, which does not need to 
necessarily be perfect, but must be reasonable (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
195 Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). 
196 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993) (holding 
that a city did not “‘carefully calculate[]’ the costs and benefits associated with the burden 
on speech imposed by its prohibition” on news racks). 
197 Reilly, 533 U.S. at 561.  For example, the Court has articulated that restrictions on the 
size and placement of advertisements may all be regulated.  Id. at 563.  Further, the 
government may impose restrictions on the distance of certain advertisements in relation to 
particular locations such as churches, schools, or parks.  Id. at 561–62.  The Court has even 
held the government may restrict how the advertisement is communicated to the recipient.  
Id. at 563.  This means that the government can selectively or comprehensively ban oral, 
written, or visual advertisements.  Id. at 561–63. 
198 See Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986) (arguing 
that the government has the power to completely ban gambling; therefore, it should have 
the less intrusive power of restricting advertising for it).  But see id. at 359 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (agreeing that the government has the power to prohibit activities such as 
gambling, prostitution, or the consumption of marijuana or liquor, but might not have the 
power to restrict speech about these items). 
199 See supra Part III.B.1 (arguing that by using the least restrictive means standard the 
government is often forced to either ban the product completely or ignore the threat to 
society to appease the voters that use the dangerous product in question). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 [2012], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss2/9
2012] Something’s Brewing 647 
groups.200  Although commercial advertising for the alleged product may 
be diminished, the product in question can still be accessed on the open 
market, and thus its utility can still be spread through word-of-mouth 
communication.201  Moreover, the reasonable fit standard limits under-
inclusion because the government can simply limit the time, place, and 
manner of the advertisements, rather than make tough decisions on 
which products to completely ban, restrict access to, or absolutely 
tolerate.202 
However, the reasonable fit standard does have pitfalls.  First, it is 
highly paternalistic.203  This standard gives the government deference to 
make a carefully calculated cost-benefit analysis in deciding whether to 
prohibit commercial speech.204  This means that the government’s 
decision to restrict commercial speech will be respected as long as 
truthful commercial information can plausibly get to consumers in an 
alternative form or method.205  This strategy gives the government 
                                                 
200 See supra note 123 (stating that over-inclusion occurs when legislation extends beyond 
the class of persons or things that it was intended to protect or regulate and burdens more 
people or things than necessary to cure the problems targeted). 
201 See Harvir S. Bansal & Peter A. Voyer, Word-of-Mouth Processes within a Services 
Purchase Decision Context, 3 J. SERV. RESEARCH 166, 175 (2000) (finding that word-of-mouth 
advertising for services is extremely effective when there is a close relationship between a 
sender and a receiver and the receiver’s high knowledge or expertise for a given service); 
Paula Fitzgerald Bone, Word-of-Mouth Effects on Short-Term and Long-Term Product 
Judgments, 32 J. BUS. RESEARCH 213, 221–22 (1995) (determining that word-of-mouth 
advertising can be more effective than print advertising and expert word-of-mouth 
advertising messages have a stronger effect than non-expert opinions;  both negative and 
positive word-of-mouth messages have short- and long-term effects on the consumption 
rates of consumers). 
202 See Bayer, supra note 4, at 356–59 (exploring the implications of proposed FDA 
regulations and the congressional efforts to ban tobacco advertising); Vladeck et al., supra 
note 80, at 33–34 (expressing the tension between the government and commercial 
advertisers over the burden of proof when the government restricts particular messages 
from being publicized when there is insufficient data to prove that the message is harmful 
or inaccurate). 
203 See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the proposition that deference should be given 
to legislators for commercial speech and stating that the Central Hudson test should not be 
applied to uphold the government’s interest in keeping “legal users of a product or service 
ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace”). 
204 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993) (concluding 
“that the city failed to address its . . . concern about newsracks by regulating their size, 
shape, appearance, or number[, which] indicates that it has not ‘carefully calculated’ the 
costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed by its prohibition”).  
Further, the ordinance failed to meet the reasonable fit standard as applied to newsracks 
because it was enacted to combat littering, not permanent fixtures on city streets.  Id. 
205 See 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 529–30 (1996) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“If alternative channels permit communication of the restricted speech, the 
regulation is more likely to be considered reasonable.”). 
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unfettered power to limit commercial speech via particular mediums, 
substantially diluting the message, or significantly diminishing the 
listening audience.206 
Therefore, having complete authority to prohibit the transmission of 
commercial messages through specific mediums and in particular 
manners, the government can effectively divert certain ideas from the 
information superhighway.207  This approach can lead consumers astray 
and affect their choices regarding which products to purchase.208  Unless 
consumers use personal initiative to learn about certain products from 
private sources, or the government actively launches its own 
informational advertising campaign to warn constituents about 
potentially harmful products, it is unlikely that citizens will ever obtain 
the knowledge they need to optimally direct their behavior. 
C. Potential Implications if the Issues Remain Unresolved 
The Court must eliminate the bifurcated analysis that exists in the 
Central Hudson test.  This change can be done by expressly accepting 
either the material degree standard or the common sense standard and 
reaffirming the use of the reasonable fit test.209  If nothing is done about 
Central Hudson’s distorted interpretation, then the consequences of its 
ambiguity will only become more exaggerated.210  If the Supreme Court 
does not intervene soon, the split in the circuits over the interpretation of 
                                                 
206 See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 6, Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 
03-1725), 2003 WL 24302476 (articulating that Pitt News used a fifty-fifty format, where the 
newspaper’s pages with news content equaled its pages with advertisements; further, 
when the state banned alcohol advertising in the paper, the newspaper was forced to 
eliminate actual news articles as well to decrease its cost in producing the newspaper after 
it lost critical advertising revenue). 
207 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 928 (explaining that many scholars fear that if the 
government is able to fully control speech, then it will inevitably abuse this power to 
advance its own goals, and many truthful messages will be censored from the general 
public). 
208 See, e.g., COMPETITIVE STRATEGY, supra note 124, at 108–09 (stating that most 
manufacturers sell their products to many different buyers, who in turn use these products 
in different ways).  Therefore, it is essential for manufactures to utilize every strategy 
possible to reach out to the buyer, including advertising, to meet the consumer’s demands 
for quality, quantity, durability, and customer service; moreover, rational consumers will 
not buy a manufacturer’s product unless their educational needs regarding the product are 
thoroughly satisfied.  Id. 
209 See infra Part IV.A (arguing that the Court should adopt the material degree standard). 
210 Compare Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 589–90 (4th Cir. 2010) (using the 
common sense standard to conclude that alcohol advertising logically causes an increase in 
underage drinking without any extrinsic evidence), with Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 
107 (3d. Cir. 2004) (using the material degree standard to prohibit government from 
banning alcohol advertisements in college newspapers because the government had no 
evidence that newspaper advertisements lead to underage or abusive drinking). 
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the third prong will continue to grow.  This split is particularly 
troublesome for national retailers and marketers.211  Inconsistent results 
throughout the judicial system may cause businesses to refuse to enter 
certain markets and deliberately exit others.212  Further, it is egregious to 
allow the First Amendment to be applied in a disparate manner 
throughout the nation. 
These differing interpretations of the Central Hudson test especially 
harm small business, which rely solely on advertising to attract a 
customer base.213  For example, a tobacco shop on the East Coast may be 
forced to shut down due to a restriction on advertising interpreted under 
the common sense approach; however, a similar business in the Midwest 
could prosper because its speech was interpreted under the material 
degree standard.214  Ultimately, these inconsistencies will either coerce 
businesses out of one market and force them into another that allows 
particular commercial advertising, or compel them to close shop 
forever.215  Alternatively, those businesses that do thrive will be more apt 
to form oligopolies and monopolies.216  Without advertisements, 
consumers will be unable to make informed decisions as to what 
                                                 
211 See MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 40, 56 (1985) [hereinafter 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE] (finding that many large domestic and international firms rely 
on geographical interrelationships, such as uniformity in the law, to keep the costs of their 
product low and to universally coordinate value activities, one of which is marketing and 
sales). 
212 See COMPETITIVE STRATEGY, supra note 124, at 13 (articulating that government 
policies, such as licensing or controls, are a major barrier that can limit or foreclose entry 
into industries). 
213 See Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 595 (“An overbroad set of regulations that unfairly 
singles out the commercial use of recorded phone messages fails to substantially advance 
the government’s interest in protecting home privacy and excludes measures that would 
address privacy concerns in an even-handed manner without unduly burdening the First 
Amendment rights of small businesses.”). 
214 See, e.g., supra Part II.C (describing how Pitt News was permitted to solicit alcoholic 
beverage vendors and recoup its advertising revenue after the Third Circuit struck down 
Pennsylvania’s law banning alcohol advertisements in education-related media, but the 
Cavalier Daily and the Collegiate Times were forced to cut sections from their newspapers 
after the Fourth Circuit held that the newspapers had to comply with Virginia’s ban on 
alcoholic beverage advertisements in education-related media). 
215 See COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 211, at 448–55 (stating that uncertainties, 
such as government policies, affect competition through industry structure and cause 
companies to adjust their strategies, leading some companies to determine that a once 
fertile market has too-high entry barriers or that competition has dwindled, so that exiting 
a particular market is in the best interest of the company). 
216 See Jackson & Jeffries, Jr., supra note 22, at 28 (concluding that “it seems plausible to 
assume that the consequence of a reduced flow of information will lead to some situational 
monopolies that would not exist if advertising were unrestricted”; this would lead to lower 
economic efficiency). 
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products and services are superior in quality or price.217  Thus, brand-
name products may take over the market if consumers are unaware of 
potentially better opportunities elsewhere.218 
Given the unique opportunity to adjudicate the Pitt News and 
Swecker cases, which strangely parallel each other, the Court can put to 
rest the contention over the conflicting interpretations.219  Additionally, 
the commercial speech doctrine would finally be able to blossom, and 
the goal of the Central Hudson Court to move away from a case-by-case 
analysis will come to fruition at last.220 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Confusion will continue to cloud the commercial speech doctrine if 
courts use varying standards for the third prong of the Central Hudson 
test and the Supreme Court does not provide the proper standard for the 
fourth prong.221  The circuit in which a business is located should not be 
determinative in adjudicating whether the business has the ability to 
promote a particular product.222  Therefore, the Supreme Court, to mend 
the contradictory interpretations that have created inconsistency and 
ambiguity in the commercial speech doctrine, must reconcile the 
conflicting standards that it has created.223 
                                                 
217 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 766–71 
(1976) (noting that price competition between retailers can be a positive economic policy 
and that consumers will not necessarily choose the best price for a product if it diminishes 
the quality of service that they get in return for their money). 
218 See id. (finding that it is better to assume that commercial information itself is not 
harmful and that people will rationally balance the quality, the price, and other 
characteristics of services and products before they buy from a particular retailer if they are 
equipped with all possible material information). 
219 See supra Part II.C.1 and Part II.C.2 (outlining the factual similarities of Pitt News and 
Swecker). 
220 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–
66 (1980) (creating a four prong test to deal with commercial speech cases after the Court 
recognized that commercial speech was entitled constitutional protection in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 526–27 (1996) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“The courts, including this Court, have found the Central Hudson ‘test’ to be, 
as a general matter, very difficult to apply with any uniformity.”). 
221 See supra Part III.A and Part III.B (analyzing how courts have struggled to uniformly 
adopt either the material degree standard or the common sense standard for the third 
prong of Central Hudson’s interpretation and how the Supreme Court has flip-flopped on 
the least restrictive means and reasonable fit standards over the past twenty years for the 
fourth Central Hudson prong). 
222 See supra Part III.C (stating that the results of similar cases in different circuits can 
have drastically different outcomes depending on whether the common sense standard or 
the material degree standard is employed). 
223 See supra text accompanying notes 173–77 (outlining the existing battle over the 
precise standard that should govern the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test). 
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First, Part IV.A will argue that the burden of proof for the third 
prong should rest on the material degree standard.224  Second, Part IV.B 
will suggest elements the Court should adopt in analyzing the third 
prong.225  Third, Part IV.C will argue that the reasonable fit test should 
be confirmed as the standard for the fourth prong and propose a set of 
factors courts can employ in adjudicating this prong.226  Finally, Part 
IV.D will discuss the implications of this new test for the Pitt News and 
Swecker decisions.227 
A. The Burden of Proof 
The burden of proof in commercial speech cases should be the 
material degree standard.228  This would require the government to 
present empirical evidence supporting any commercial speech ban.229  
The goal of the government should be to increase the availability of 
information to the public, not to restrict it.  This standard would allow 
substantive information to flow to the public.  Also, the government 
would appear to be acting with valid authority when it attempts to 
protect society from harmful advertising, rather than appearing as a 
paternalistic force in its citizens’ lives.230 
Further, in keeping with traditional constitutional law norms, the 
government has the burden of proof in intermediate scrutiny cases.  By 
placing the burden of proof on the government in commercial speech 
cases, the Court would continue to apply a consistent, bright-line rule for 
all intermediate scrutiny cases, instead of creating different standards 
                                                 
224 See infra Part IV.A (stating that the material degree standard should govern the third 
prong of the Central Hudson test because factual evidence ought to be required before the 
government can justify a restriction on a person’s right to freedom of speech). 
225 See infra Part IV.B (arguing that sub-elements must be placed under the third prong of 
the analysis to ensure that the government does not arbitrarily or wrongfully deprive 
commercial advertisers of their speech rights). 
226 See infra Part IV.C (articulating that the reasonable fit test should be confirmed as the 
correct standard for the fourth prong and that a factors test should be used to guide 
decisions so that they are not determined solely on a case-by-case basis). 
227 See infra Part IV.D (arguing that the newly proposed test would harmonize the 
conflicting Pitt News and Swecker decisions because they would both fail under this 
analysis). 
228 See supra Part III.A.1 (articulating the pros and cons of the material degree standard). 
229 See supra Part III.B (arguing that the reasonable fit standard safeguards the public 
from a paternalistic government because it requires hard evidence that there is a societal 
harm being caused by a particular strain of commercial speech). 
230 See supra text accompanying notes 123 and 124 (noting that critics argue commercial 
speech should be protected to limit over- and under-inclusion and governmental 
paternalism). 
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within the doctrine.231  Therefore, in commercial speech cases, the 
government should have the burden of proof to show that its interest in 
limiting commercial speech is materially advanced through empirical 
evidence. 
B. Sub-Elements of the Third Prong of Central Hudson 
To ensure that the government does not arbitrarily restrict 
commercial speech, the following test for Central Hudson’s third prong 
should be implemented:  (1) the target group must actually suffer an 
injury from the commercial speech; (2) the defendant, disseminating 
information individually, must substantially cause the injury to the 
target group; and (3) a favorable judgment must materially mitigate the 
harm done to the target group. 
First, the government must prove that the target group actually 
suffered an injury.  This proof can be shown by:  (1) identifying the 
group of people that the government wishes to protect; and (2) offering 
statistical evidence to show the existence of a causal relationship 
between particular strains of commercial speech and the harm done to 
the specific group.  By mandating that the government offer empirical 
evidence to uphold a restriction on commercial speech, the Court would 
instantly legitimize the injury done to society.232  Further, the Court 
would promote awareness of how consumers psychologically respond to 
certain advertisements. Additionally, by forcing states and 
municipalities to hypothesize about the harms allegedly created as a 
result of advertising and to produce data to support these claims, the 
government would give academics the ability to analyze data 
nationwide in order to determine the likely cause of the specific societal 
harm.233 
Second, the government must prove that the defendant, acting alone, 
is causing harm to society.  This criterion would prevent the under-
inclusive censoring of commercial speech, such as prohibiting printed 
advertisements when television advertisements substantially add to the 
harm as well.234  Further, the government would be able to list 
                                                 
231 See supra text accompanying note 117 (explaining that courts inconsistently apply 
Central Hudson because the Court has subsequently applied different standards and 
because the Justices are divided philosophically). 
232 See supra Part III.A.1 (arguing that speculative evidence presented by the government, 
without any factual data, appears paternalistic). 
233 See supra Part III.A.1 (stating that the government must point to some scintilla of 
evidence either in the form of statistics or anecdotes to justify a restriction on commercial 
speech). 
234 See supra text accompanying note 100 (describing Pitt News, where the Third Circuit 
found Act 199 was dangerously over- and under-inclusive). 
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companies in a specific industry as joint defendants showing that, acting 
together, they are the root cause of the harm. 
Third, the government must prove that its action materially 
mitigates the harm done by commercial speech.  To satisfy this sub-
element, the government would have to prove, through empirical 
evidence, that its action against an advertisement actually reduces a 
particular threat to society.235  In other words, the government must have 
factual proof before it closes any channels of communication. 
C. Reaffirmation of the Reasonable Fit Test and Proposed Factors 
To give the Central Hudson test a solid foundation and thus 
strengthen the commercial speech doctrine, the Supreme Court must 
reaffirm its holding that the reasonable fit test governs the fourth 
prong.236  Likewise, the Court must provide criteria for determining 
what is a reasonable fit to opt out of a case-by-case approach to the 
commercial speech doctrine. 
One possible way of creating this structured analysis is through a 
factors test.  Factors a court can utilize in assessing the fit between the 
means and ends of a restriction on commercial speech are:  (1) are there 
alternatives other than a total ban on commercial speech; (2) is the 
restriction medium-neutral; (3) do similar products face similar 
restrictions; (4) what locality created the law; (5) is the range of speech 
restricted or banned; and (6) is enforcement of other laws impractical. 
The existence of other alternatives to a total ban on commercial 
speech is an important factor in assessing the fit between the ends and 
the means of a restriction on commercial speech.  For example, the 
taxation of a particular product may be a more reasonable and effective 
alternative to reduce the harm caused by that product. 
Additionally, the existence of medium-specific laws should be taken 
into account.237  If the government prohibits advertising in one medium, 
but permits it in another, there must be a justification for this 
discrepancy.  If the alleged harm is truly pervasive, then it should be 
presumed that the government’s restriction must uniformly ban all 
forms of speech concerning that product to be effective.  Further, 
                                                 
235 See supra Part III.A.1 (describing Central Hudson’s material degree standard). 
236 See supra Part III.B (explaining that the Court has historically flip-flopped on the 
standard governing the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test and that the Supreme Court 
has heard very few commercial speech cases since it instituted the reasonable fit test a 
decade ago). 
237 See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing that a pitfall of the reasonable fit standard is that it 
currently gives the government too much discretion to pick and choose what mediums to 
regulate). 
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medium-neutral laws eliminate divisiveness among mediums and allow 
the government to appear unbiased. 
A significant factor in deciding if there is a reasonable fit is uniform 
speech rights for similar products.  If the government’s interest in 
banning a substance is to limit the effects of its consumption, then the 
government ought to impose uniform regulations on all manufacturers 
of similar products.238  This principle promotes fairness throughout 
industries and bolsters the effect of the government’s action. 
Furthermore, the locality of the jurisdiction implementing the law 
should be a factor in assessing whether the restriction on commercial 
speech is a reasonable fit.  This approach would require courts to look at 
the history and tradition of each state’s legislature regarding commercial 
speech.  It would also require courts to account for the norms of each 
jurisdiction. 
The range of speech being restricted is also a critical factor in 
assessing whether the government’s constraint is a proper fit.  A court 
should examine questions such as:  (1) where the speech is restricted;  (2) 
how the speech is restricted; and (3) to what extent product information 
can still enter the market.239  For example, a court may find that banning 
solicitation, but permitting advertising, is sufficient to advance the 
government’s interest. 
Lastly, courts should inquire into whether the enforcement of other 
laws is possible, rather than restricting speech.  The policing of other 
laws, aimed at consumers, could decrease a particular societal harm just 
as effectively.  In this case, the legislature should focus on regulating 
these laws, rather than punishing advertisers because consumers abuse 
their products. 
D. The Newly Proposed Test Applied in Swecker and Pitt News 
If this newly proposed test is applied in Pitt News and Swecker, both 
cases would undoubtedly fail Central Hudson’s third prong.  In Pitt News, 
the government would not be able to prove that alcohol advertisements 
would mitigate the consumption of alcohol by underage students to a 
material degree.240  Likewise, in Swecker, evidence showed that alcohol 
                                                 
238 See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487–90 (1995) (arguing that the 
federal policy banning alcohol manufacturers from printing the alcohol content on malt 
beverage containers, but not on wine or spirit containers, was illogical because wine and 
spirits have a greater alcohol percentage, and thus present a greater danger to the public). 
239 See supra text accompanying notes 181–83 (describing the least restrictive means test). 
240 See Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 107 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the law banning 
alcohol advertisements in college newspapers provided ineffective and remote support for 
the government’s purposes). 
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consumption on the state university campuses had increased even after 
the law had been enacted.241 
Moreover, the government would likely not be able to show a 
reasonable fit under the proposed factors test in Swecker or Pitt News.  In 
both cases, there were alternatives to banning alcohol advertisements in 
college newspapers; most notably, the greater enforcement of underage 
drinking laws.  Further, both cases involved medium-specific laws.242  
Alcohol advertisements were banned in school newspapers, but not on 
the television channels that played on dorm-room TVs.243  Lastly, the 
states did not attempt to ban advertising for similar products such as 
tobacco, contraceptives, or prescription medication in college 
newspapers—all equally obtainable by young people.  Therefore, these 
laws were severely under-inclusive. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Without any guidance from the Supreme Court on how to interpret 
the third prong of the Central Hudson test, the split in the circuit courts 
will surely grow.  Further, multiple standards concerning the 
commercial speech doctrine will diminish the legitimacy of the First 
Amendment.  Concrete and predictable rules are essential if the rights 
listed in the Constitution can flourish and be enjoyed by all.  By 
instituting the material degree standard on a uniform basis, courts can 
guarantee that advertisers understand the laws that govern their actions 
and consumers will be delivered only reliable, safe, and necessary 
commercial messages. 
Moreover, by adopting the set of proposed fourth-prong factors in 
this Note, the Court can shift from a case-by-case analysis to a more 
unified body of commercial speech case law.  More importantly, by 
analyzing a set of predetermined factors, the integrity of court decisions 
will improve because judgments will be viewed as founded in law, not 
in judicial discretion. 
When the government impedes on intimate things, such as the right 
to receive and convey ideas, there ought to be a universal rule applied to 
                                                 
241 See Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 593–94 n.5 (4th Cir. 2010) (Moon, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the government had conceded that drinking on college campuses 
had increased after the law banning alcohol advertisements in college newspapers was 
passed). 
242 See 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-498(e)(5) (1996) (prohibiting alcohol advertisements in 
any booklet, program book, yearbook, magazine, newspaper, or other publication of any 
educational institution); 3 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-20-40 (2010) (prohibiting alcoholic 
beverage advertisements “in college student publications”) (as amended). 
243 Pitt News, 379 F.3d at 107. 
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all.  Surely, if the Court does not soon address the current Central Hudson 
analysis, unjust case-by-case adjudications will thwart the progress of 
the commercial speech doctrine and ultimately lead to its demise.  In the 
meantime, small newspapers and media outlets like the Pitt News, 
Cavalier Daily, and Collegiate Times will be forced to cut sections and 
perhaps even close.  As a result, the vital information, both political and 
commercial, disseminated by these small, low-budget media sources will 
cease to flow to the public. 
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